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Yevgeny Primakov was an important figure in both Soviet and Russian foreign policy circles 
throughout his lifetime until 2015. He was a critical leader in the 1990s holding positions of 
both Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, which also coincided with times when 
Russia was charting a new foreign policy course. He reinvented a foreign policy school of 
thought called Statism which has been the most influential with Russian leaders for many 
years and continues to be so today. Current research has not adequately addressed his 
importance. This thesis set out to investigate his beliefs and worldview utilizing the 
operational code method using Alexander George’s ten question model. Research was 
conducted based on Primakov’s own writings, speeches and interviews.  
 
Yevgeny Primakov has been called both a westernizing leader and a hard-liner, but it was 
found both of these labels are incorrect. Rather, he should be viewed as a patriotic 
pragmatist. His actions were motivated by advancing Russian interests of which one of the 
greatest was restoring Russia as a major player in international relations again. His attitude 
towards the United States was complex, viewing them as a rival, yet not as an enemy. He 
opposed American hegemony which had emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Primakov wanted Russia to get back in the great power game as an equal and came up with 
innovative and pragmatic strategies to make it happen. The most important of these 
strategies was a foreign policy concept called multipolarity which was intended to diversify 
Russia’s foreign ties with other emerging powers and counterbalance the unipolar system 
he thought would cause instability and chaos in the long-run.  
 
It was found that Yevgeny Primakov was more important for Russia’s foreign policy 
formulation than first meets the eye. His ideas and efforts have been praised by both past 
and present Russian leaders, including Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Putin. After comparing 
Putin and Primakov’s operational codes they were found to be remarkably complementary. 
Putin has implemented many of Primakov’s ideas and listened to his recommendations. This 
is perhaps because Putin himself lacks the qualities of a grand strategist, whilst Primakov 
embodied them. In the future, other scholars could use Primakov’s operational code and the 
analysis presented here to evaluate if Russian leaders are putting into practice a “Primakov 
Doctrine,” an idea which has sometimes been discussed, but not officially declared.  
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As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. 
But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make.1 
–Henry Kissinger
                                                 
1 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” 
International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 108. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Yevgeny Primakov was an important statesman in both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. 
At the height of his career he held positions as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. He 
was also an academic who helped strengthen the role of Statism, a Russian foreign policy school of 
thought most prominent in Russia today. He believed Russia should seek to become a great power 
once again and came up with a vision for a new world order called multipolarity.  
 
Due to his leadership roles and influence on past and present Russian leaders, understanding Yevgeny 
Primakov is important to understanding past and present Russian foreign policy. This thesis was 
written because Yevgeny Primakov’s role in Russian policymaking has been largely ignored in the 
current literature on Russia. Constructing his operational code and shedding light on his contributions 
will hopefully provide new insights about Russian foreign policy development, offer a deeper 
understanding of a major foreign policy figure and open up new areas of research.   
 
1.1. Primakov in the Context of Russian Foreign Policy 
To begin understanding who Primakov was, one must first grasp the historical, social and political 
context in which he rose to power. Russia has never been a nation-state, but rather it has been an 
empire. Historically the people of Russia have always struggled with an identity crisis about who 
they are, where they belong and what their purpose is. These issues were brought to the surface once 
again in December 1991 when the Soviet Union rapidly disintegrated. As Nationalists and Democrats 
emerged as major ideological factions, both felt uneasy with the fact that some parts of the old Union 
were no longer part of the Russian Federation (Russia). At the same time, the old debates about 
Russian identity, whether they are European, Asian or perhaps Eurasian, bridging the two continents, 
re-emerged. Russia had to reinvent itself and look for a new direction and a new role in the 
international arena. Russia was battling the financial troubles of the Soviet Union, yet it was no longer 
a superpower with the resources and influence that come with that status. It could be argued that at 
the time it had lost even its great power status. The cards Russian leaders were left holding in their 
hands were not worth much. In the midst of all this, there was a popular insistence for a new official 
foreign policy formulation. Finally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev agreed to put 
something together.2 
                                                 
2 Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking,” in Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Neil Malcolm, Alex 
Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 36-38. 
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Kozyrev was a Westernist, a foreign policy school of thought to be introduced in more detail in the 
following sections. Here is it sufficient to say he believed Russia should try to integrate with and 
become like the West (used throughout this research to mean Western Europe and North America). 
After a few years of little success and many failures he was replaced by Yevgeny Primakov, a Statist 
who had very different views of proper Russian foreign policy. As a Statist Primakov wanted Russia 
to be a strong and independent great power, a stark departure from his predecessor. He wanted to 
focus on the fact that Russia was a great power and worthy of the respect that comes along that status. 
He advocated for a new world order in the form of multipolarity, a system in which there are many 
centers of power, not just the United States. Naturally, he desired Russia to act as a major influencer 
in this new system.3 Furthermore, Primakov was a robust supporter of Russian hard national interests 
and while understanding that the old Soviet states were gone for good he thought Russia should keep 
them close4.  
 
As it turned out, however, holding on to interests even in the former Soviet areas proved to be a 
difficult task and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expanded rapidly leaving many 
Russians feeling deceived about its intentions. They had hoped that the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) would have become the guarantor for European security instead of 
NATO. When the NATO expansion happened, Russia was still materially too weak to back up 
Primakov’s newly assertive foreign policy doctrine. They instead chose to adapt to the situation by 
signing the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between Russia and NATO 
in 1997.5 To make matters worse from the Russian perspective, Russia was not able to jumpstart their 
economy and thus properly improve their armed forces. The government was forced to seek loans, 
for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which they had unsuccessfully tried to 
avoid. This meant that Russia became subject to more Western control at a time when their foreign 
policy was advocating the opposite. Primakov technically allowed this to happen, in the name of 
pragmatism, but his close supporters were not happy with it.6 
 
                                                 
3 Yevgeny Primakov, “Russia Is Restoring Its Great Power Status,” International Affairs (Moscow) 53, no. 2 (2007): 67-
69.  
4 Andrei Poleshchuk, “Is an Expansion of NATO Justified?” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 45, no. 47 (1993): 
11-13. 
5 Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Lanham: Rowman &       
  Littlefiels Publishers, Inc., 2013), 101, 105-106 
6 Ibid., 106-107. 
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Russia’s struggles in the 1990s showed that some of Primakov’s foreign policy goals and ideas were 
a bit premature since Russia did not have the material backing to act on more assertive policy goals. 
However, his ideas should be carefully revisited today. First, because he has been recently talked 
about by Russian leaders.  And, second, today Russia is in a better position to act on his ideas and as 
a country Russia has gained more credibility. Simply put, times are different now and when asked 
about the change in Russian foreign policy after Putin’s third presidential term Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sergey Lavrov said in an interview that 
as for the changes in the Russian foreign policy, yes, we have more domestic strength, if 
you wish. We have become stronger economically; we have been successfully resolving 
the social problems, raising the level of living — the standards of living — of the 
population. Yes, a lot is to be done. But the change is very much noticed. And we feel 
the change. And Russia feels more assertive — not aggressive, but assertive. And we 
have been getting out of the situation where we found ourselves in the early ’90s when 
the Soviet Union disappeared and the Russian Federation became what it is — you 
know, with no borders, with no budget, no money, and with huge problems starting with 
lack of food and so on and so forth. It is a very different country now. And of course we 
can now pay more attention to looking after our legitimate interests in the areas where 
we were absent for quite some time after the demise of the Soviet Union.7 
 
It is not just Lavrov who is impressed with Primakov’s ideas, but also Vladimir Putin. Putin’s 
intellectual dept to Primakov’s ideas could be detected already in his speech to Russian ambassadors 
given in 20128. It stressed the need for a more assertive foreign policy to guarantee that Russian 
interests abroad are taken care of and the importance of Russia as a balancer in the world. Many 
believe that Putin has put into practice a foreign policy line formulated by Primakov9. In a speech at 
Primakov’s funeral in June of 2015 the Russian President admits to having sought advice from 
Primakov and having shared plans with him.10 Additionally, in 2018, in a greeting to participants of 
“Primakov Readings International Forum,” a platform for foreign policy discussions, Putin stated that 
“interest in the rich intellectual heritage of Dr. Primakov is obviously not waning, due to the fact that 
many of his assessments and forecasts of international development have been confirmed and 
continue to be confirmed by reality.”11 There is nothing particularly surprising or shocking about 
Primakov’s thinking, but if studying his thoughts help us better understand Russia’s foreign policy, 
                                                 
7 Susan Glasser, “Sergei Lavrov and the Blunt Logic of Russian Power,” Foreign Policy, April 29 2013, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/minister-no/. 
8 “Meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organisations”, Kremlin, accessed 
November 28, 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15902. 
9 Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia and the West: Taking the Longer View,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no.  2 (2007): 126. 
10  “Funeral Ceremony for Yevgeny Primakov”, Kremlin, accessed November 28, 2015, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49782. 
11 “Greeting to Organisers and Participants of Primakov Readings International Forum,” Kremlin, accessed July 31, 2018, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57590.  
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we should not fail to do so. In fact, Russians are studying them too with great enthusiasm. It may only 
help us to understand what has happened in the past, but it might also help us map out more current 
ways of understanding Russian interests, what they could be, and how they could be better pursued.  
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The first goal of this thesis is to shine light on Yevgeny Primakov, who was an important figure 
shaping Russian foreign policy, but also one who has been neglected in recent, serious research. The 
second goal is to reintroduce him to the field of foreign policy analysis by mapping out his operational 
code. By doing so his world view, impressions of opponents, interests and the best ways to achieve 
them, among other important issues, will be revealed. Analyzing Primakov’s writings in a systematic 
way is critical to success, because he tended to use very vague and diplomatic language which might 
be hard to interpret if only encountered briefly or out of context of the larger whole. The operational 
code provides the systematic tool required for understanding a person’s character and ideas, which 
also allows us to analyze their influence on the broader foreign policy scene. Thus, the third goal of 
this thesis will be to provide some limited and circumspect insight into current Russian foreign policy 
given that Primakov undoubtedly influenced policy formulation while he was active as a leader and 
later as a policy adviser.  
 
1.3. Beliefs and Leaders 
Primakov was a powerful individual throughout his lifetime whose beliefs left an imprint on Russian 
foreign policy debates. Thus, both beliefs and individual leaders are closely linked to this study. 
However, the study of individuals and leaders was largely ignored by many foreign policy scholars 
until after the Cold War when it gained more popularity.12 Opponents of the study of individuals 
might suggest that studying individuals is either unnecessary, due to their small significance 
compared to the bigger picture, or that they are too hard to study13. If, however studying leaders is 
deemed beneficial, one logical way of doing it is to study their beliefs. One way this can be achieved 
is by using the operational code research method.  
 
Many structural theories insist beliefs simply mirror reality. However, the cognitive theories utilized 
in this thesis assume that beliefs shape perceptions of reality and filter the information coming from 
                                                 
12 Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters,” Foreign Policy 110, 
no. 110 (April 1998): 124-125.  
13 Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men,” 108.  
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the outside world.14 This insight makes studying individuals and their specific ways of understanding 
the world (beliefs) both fruitful and useful for the field of foreign policy studies. Scholars do not 
necessarily have to choose between system level analysis and individual level analysis, an issue which 
will be discussed in more detail later. For better results, these two levels of analysis can be combined 
and viewed as mutually beneficial.15 The focus of this thesis is to study one individual, Yevgeny 
Primakov and his beliefs, using the operational code as a research method. However, this will be done 
keeping the larger context of Russian foreign policy in mind; helping the reader to find information 
provided here more relevant. 
 
1.4. Method  
The operational code is a research method developed by Nathan Leites in the 1950s in the context of 
the Soviet Politburo.16 The purpose of this method is to map out a research subject’s world view and 
how they see themselves within it. The advantage of this method is that it produces information 
benefiting not only academia, but also policy makers17. Leites’ work inspired Alexander George in 
1969 to come up with his own technique for constructing an operational code. George’s method was 
based on ten questions about the research subject which are answered utilizing the subject’s own 
speeches and texts. The first five questions he named philosophical and the last five instrumental. His 
operational code was simpler and easier to reproduce compared to the original texts of Nathan 
Leites18. George’s ten questions are used in this thesis as a basis for putting together Yevgeny 
Primakov’s operational code and to provide a context for anyone else who seeks to reproduce a 
similar study. The answers to George’s questions come only from Primakov’s own texts, speeches 
and interviews, translated from Russian or later published in a written English language context, or 
from his own books originally published in English. 
 
The operational code method combined with Alexander George’s ten question model proved to be 
the best choice for studying Yevgeny Primakov and his ideas about Russian foreign policy. Different 
                                                 
14 Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of 
Operational Code Analysis. 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 5.  
15 Ibid., 248.  
16 See: Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo leaders (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951). AND Nathan 
Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953).  
17 Stephen Benedict Dyson and Matthew J. Parent, “The Operational Code Approach to Profiling Political Leaders: 
Understanding Vladimir Putin,” Intelligence and National Security 33, no. 1 (2018): 85. 
18 Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-
Making,” Inernational Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1969): 193. 
 6 
types of discourse analysis or the so-called Verbs in Context System (VICS), which is a computerized 
verb analysis tool for studying operational codes, may have been able to produce similar information. 
However, due to the fact that this research is done based on English language texts, and not texts in 
the research subject’s native language, the operational code analysis used here proved to be the best 
option. It has also been used to study Vladimir Putin by Stephen Benedict Dyson in 2001,19 and 
Dyson and Parent in 201820 and in its original form by Nathan Leites21 to examine the Soviet 
Politburo. Analysis, for example, based solely on computerized algorithms might at first appear more 
scientific compared to merely interpreting the research subject’s texts relying on ten questions. 
However, as will be discussed later, politicians like Primakov do not often reveal their true intentions 
on paper and it could mislead the researcher if only his words on paper are dissected and scrutinized.  
 
It is more important to read multiple texts analyzed in their various contexts and consider the overall 
message stemming from them. Yevgeny Primakov has over time been interpreted both as a hard-liner 
and a Westernizing reformer22,23. For example, Jeffrey Surovell has strongly argued for the latter by 
claiming, that in his texts and speeches Primakov appears to be a socialist hard-liner, but in practice 
he is the opposite24. This thesis will take a stand on this issue too, but in order to do it properly one 
must analyze text as it is written in different contexts, but also compare it to practical actions taken 
by the individual and bring both together as the basis for final analysis.  
 
1.5. Challenges  
Some challenges facing this research stem from relying on translations from original texts, although 
a good portion of the material used was published in English to begin with. Meaning can be lost in 
translation and English publications present additional, unique complications. For example, Primakov 
directed some of his English language books toward an American audience to create a particular 
image of Russia, which does not necessarily help the researcher understand his most original ideas. 
                                                 
19 Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Drawing Policy Implications from the ‘Operational Code’ of a ‘New’ Political Actor: 
Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Policy Sciences 34, no. 3/4 (2001). 
20 Dyson and Parent, “The Operational Code Approach.”  
21 Leites, The Operational Code. 
22 Ariel Cohen, The “Primakov Doctrine”: Russia’s Zero-Sum Game with the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Heritage 
Foundation, 1997). 
23 Jeffrey Surovell, “Yevgenii Primakov: ‘Hard-Liner’ or Casualty of the Conventional Wisdom,” Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics 21, no. 2 (2005). 
24 Ibid., 241-243. 
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Politicians such as Yevgeny Primakov, who was also an experienced diplomat, tend to carefully stick 
to their preplanned agenda and rhetoric.  
 
These are all valid concerns, but ones that must be accepted if the operational code method is to be 
used. The study of individuals is tricky. However, when it is done carefully it can also provide insight 
into the larger system level context, which is one of the goals of this thesis.    
 
1.6. Organization of Research 
This thesis will start out by introducing the operational code as a method. Next, the reader will be 
familiarized with the study of leaders and beliefs in international relations. Then, three major Russian 
foreign policy schools of thought: Civilizationism, Westernism and Statism will be introduced briefly. 
The latter was one that Primakov promoted and helped develop25. Understanding these schools of 
though is important for being able to place Yevgeny Primakov in the right context within the 
landscape of Russian foreign policy thinking. Next, Primakov will be introduced as a person and 
some of his career highlights will be pointed out. This is followed by an explanation of Primakov’s 
policy of multipolarity and his vision for a new world order after the Cold War. These are necessary 
elements to cover before digging into his operational code, which without this background 
information would be difficult to comprehend. Then we will proceed to answer Alexander George’s 
ten questions which taken together form Primakov’s operational code. His operational code will be 
followed by analysis where key elements from the answers to the ten questions will be discussed and 
dissected. Finally, the thesis will pull together the whole research in a conclusion.  
 
                                                 
25 Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 74 
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2. OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS AS A METHOD 
Nathan Leites was the first to use operational code analysis in his study The Operational Code of the 
Politburo which he later expanded into a more complete book A Study of Bolshevism both of which 
he wrote in the early 1950s.26 The purpose of these studies was to figure out “the rules which 
Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct,” to figure out “the political strategy 
of Bolshevism,”27 and “to portray the spirit of the Bolshevik elite.”28 Leites’ work was published 
during times when behavioral approaches were increasingly used to study political elites. Previous 
studies in the field were asking new questions which traditional research approaches could not give 
answers to. However, the new research could not cope well with issues such as leaders’ political 
orientations, styles of calculation and behavior in general.29 Leites attempted to go a step further.  
 
The Operational Code of the Politburo was written under the Rand Corporation for the United States 
Air Force. In the 1950s, the Communist Soviet Union and its new leaders and their way of doing 
business was raising questions which Leites’ book sought to answer.30 The findings of the original 
study were deemed so useful, that the book was used as a tactical manual by Americans when 
negotiating the truce during the Korean War31.  
 
By studying mostly Lenin and Stalin’s recorded verbal accounts, Leites’ was able to analyze 
Bolshevik doctrine32. Since Leites’ studies were published, the operational code has been further 
developed into a standardized research tool. Generally speaking, the goal of the operational code 
analysis is to study the different beliefs that political leaders have based on their writings, speeches 
and occasionally interviews. Here, we will only focus on the research tool used by Alexander George, 
because his method of ten questions will be utilized in this thesis.  
 
The operational code research paradigm did not immediately become a popular tool among political 
scientists. In 1969 Alexander George, Leites’ student, published an article with a telling title The 
                                                 
26 George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach,” 193. 
27 Leites, The Operational Code, xi.  
28 Leites, A Study of Bolshevism, 15. 
29 George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach,” 192. 
30 Leites, The Operational Code, vii. 
31 Daniel Bell, “Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences,” World 
Politics 10, no. 3 (1958): 339.  
32 Leites, A Study of Bolshevism, 15. 
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‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making33. 
He thought the basic idea behind Leites’ original studies was intriguing, although he found them 
unnecessarily complex and difficult to read. He then decided to make the operational code more 
usable by reinterpreting and restructuring aspects of the code by coming up with ten questions which 
a researcher can use to collect and analyze their data from which the operational code can be deducted. 
What is further convenient is that the answers to the questions are intended to be collected from 
information that is usually readily available to political scientists.34 Leites’ book discusses a broad 
spectrum of issues and does not only focus on the operational code. George wanted to make his own 
approach simply about the operational code and redefined its boundaries. For example, he got rid of 
“the psychoanalytically based characterological aspect of operational code analysis and focused upon 
the ‘maxims of political strategy’ solely as beliefs”, as Stephen Walker puts it35. Another added 
benefit is that there is now a way to reproduce the research, an important aspect of academic rigor. 
Below are the ten questions broken down into George’s two categories.  
 
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS 
1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? 
What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents? 
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and 
aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the 
one and/or the other? 
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent 
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in 
"moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction? 
5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development? 
 
INSTRUMENTAL QUESTIONS 
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? 
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests? 
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? 36 
 
By answering these two sets of questions we can find out which issues and aspects guide a research 
subject’s way of determining which actions to take (philosophical beliefs) and what that person 
                                                 
33 George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach,” 190-222. 
34 Ibid., 193-196. 
35 Stephen Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis,” Political Psychology 11, no. 2 (1990): 404.  
36 George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach,” 201-216. 
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believes to be the best strategy and tactics for achieving his goals (instrumental beliefs)37,38. Leites 
never laid out these questions, but George derived them from his books and used them as a foundation 
for developing a new system for studying operational codes more efficiently. By coming up with 
these questions, George hoped to facilitate similar studies of other leaders and leadership groups in 
order to produce systematic comparative studies39. These ten questions, while covering much of 
political life, also reflect the fact that humans have a need to simplify the complexity of the world 
around them in order to cope with it. The operational code only focuses on politics and does not take 
into account all possible beliefs and attitudes influencing an actor’s behavior.40  
 
George found Leites’ “operational code” name misleading since it “implies, incorrectly, a set of 
recipes or repertoires for political action that an elite applies mechanically in its decision-making.”41 
George did not come up with a new name but stated that for example “approaches to political 
calculation” would have been more appropriate42. Leites’ explains in his own work that a person’s 
beliefs serve 
as a prism that influences the actor’s perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, 
his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, 
standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy and tactics, his 
structuring and weighting of alternative courses of action. Such a belief system influences, 
but does not unilaterally determine, decision-making; it is an important, but not the only, 
variable that shapes decision-making behavior.43 
 
According to Walker, the operational code paradigm is a variant of the classical rational-actor 
paradigm of decision-making, even though leaders are expected to behave differently and possess 
different beliefs. Yet, with the help of the paradigm we can map out an individual’s own way of 
viewing the world and the boundaries of rational behavior within which the actor can be expected to 
operate. What makes the operational code analysis especially useful, is that it can account for the 
anomalies within the classical rational-actor paradigm (which assumes that all decision-makers 
approach rationality the same way).44 This is because cognitive theories, such as the operational code, 
assume that a decision-maker’s rationality is directed by his “system of beliefs” when identifying 
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42 Ibid., 220. 
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ends and means45. When discussing his own approach to rationality, Alexander George has said that 
“to describe behavior as ‘rational’ is to say little more than that the actor attempts to choose a course 
of action that he hopes or expects to further his values.”46 
 
The operational code research method gained in popularity after George restructured the premises, 
inspiring a whole generation of case studies on various leaders.47 Some changes to the operational 
code study have been suggested after George’s reformulation had been introduced, but his ten 
questions have remained the industry standard for deducing actors’ operational codes ever since48. 
Among these George-inspired studies are, for example, one about Vladimir Putin (Dyson)49, Henry 
Kissinger in the context of the Vietnam War (Walker)50 and Ayman al-Zawahiri (Jacquier)51.  
 
The operational code analysis is a very useful tool for students of foreign policy, but like all methods 
it comes some shortfalls. For example, one problem is that researchers are trying to form a wholistic 
picture of a person’s thoughts, patterns of thought and beliefs without ever going near them. 
Interviews are usually impossible to conduct, but even in a rare case of being able to get someone to 
sit down with a researcher, one could not trust that everything the interviewee says reflects truthfully 
on their character. The primary way of compiling someone’s operational code is to rely on speeches 
and written texts. But politicians are good at constructing images of themselves and carefully 
maintaining them. Another challenge for the researcher is to interpret available texts and speeches 
properly, so that the final work reflects the research subject and not the researcher themselves.52 
 
Regardless of possible problems, it is still worth studying individual leaders and their ways of viewing 
the world, which is linked to foreign policy decisions. Probably the best way to use these micro-level 
analyses is to comprehend them in their wider context, shedding light where other types of methods 
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fail to tread. As George himself puts it: “even provisional answers to the research questions 
encompassed by the operational code are likely to be useful.”53 
 
This thesis will analyze material by Yevgeny Primakov including speeches, essays in journals, 
newspaper interviews and his books to answer George’s ten questions. The operational code analysis 
is often used to map out a leader’s belief system in a way that we can predict what they might do in 
certain situations. In other words, the operational code analysis is sometimes used as a prediction 
tool.54 In this particular thesis, these questions are used to map out Primakov’s operational code, but 
since he died in 2015, there is no use to predicting his behavior. Usually the operational code analysis 
is run on leaders who are still active in politics or at least still alive. However, this is not the first time 
the operation has been applied in this manner. An example of a similar study has been written about 
Mao Zedong as recently as 2005 (Feng)55. This shows, that the operational code can be a useful tool 
even when the subject has passed away if only to shed light on the wider foreign policy environment 
which the subject helped to build. 
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3. BELIEFS AND LEADERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Deriving information about Yevgeny Primakov is based on the idea that individual leaders matter and 
that they can be studied, utilizing for example George’s ten question format, to produce important 
information for the International Relations field of study. So, we must address how leaders and beliefs 
are studied and thought about in the field and how the agent centered, and system level approaches 
relate to each other.  
 
3.1. Leaders  
As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in 
practice, you see the difference personalities make.56 -Henry Kissinger 
 
Whether individual leaders really matter in international relations studies or not, due to the whole 
system being mainly influenced by larger factors such as anarchy, institutions and domestic politics, 
has been a question in the field for a long time. For some scholars, individuals are simply unnecessary 
to study since studies on them do not say much about the larger world, just the individual case in 
question. Alternatively, some find individual leaders too difficult to study in practice.57 Other scholars 
find the entire idea of individuals as a focus troubling and point to certain systemic pressures and 
issues that ultimately make most leaders the same regardless of individual qualities. It could be argued 
that most leaders who have a chance at rising to the top in a particular country at a particular time all 
possess similar beliefs and values, and once in office are socialized by the system or alternatively 
find themselves otherwise constrained.58 
 
However, the idea of studying individuals is not a new one and, for example, Classical Realists 
Thucydides, Niccoló Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau all have acknowledged their importance.59 
During the Cold War, the study of individuals in political science was pushed to the margins for the 
above-mentioned reasons, but also because in a bipolar system there was not thought to be much 
room for creativity. Foreign policy formulators were seen to be limited in their options when 
rationality was assumed. Once the Cold War was over however, scholars became once again 
interested in individual leaders. This could be explained by the change in the international 
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environment and the “new world order” which had suddenly become more complex and more 
ambiguous.60 
 
There are certain specific conditions that, if met, make the study of individuals more beneficial. 
Individuals can be said to matter more in authoritarian states than in liberal democracies, though a 
system of government does not rule out this method in any case. Crisis situations or ambiguous 
conditions may also make the role of an individual more important, since top leaders are less likely 
to delegate tasks in these situations to lower level decision makers. Yet other situations call for expert 
help, rising certain individuals such as Henry Kissinger to a more prominent position making their 
individual characteristics and personalities more interesting to scholars. Lastly, diplomatic training, 
expert knowledge and an emotional connection to a certain area or topic can make a single individual 
important when studying decision-making.61 
 
3.2. Beliefs 
If, as scholars, we assume that it is indeed worthwhile to study individual leaders, one should also be 
concerned about how leaders view the world and examine leaders’ individual beliefs. Structural 
theory proponents among the Neorealist, Neoliberal and Constructivist schools of thought assume 
decision-makers’ beliefs mirror contemporary realities they are facing at home and abroad. What 
these realities are, depend on the theory in question. Neorealists focus on the balance of power, 
Neoliberals on economic and political institutions, while Constructivists may turn to international 
law and cultural norms.62 Cognitive theories depart from structural ones by assuming that beliefs are 
not simply mirroring reality, but rather steer individuals’ decisions by shaping perceptions of reality 
and acting as a filter through which information stemming from the outside comes in63.  
 
This means, that we cannot assume all leaders to act similarly in a similar situation. Cognitive theories 
assume bounded rationality which means that leaders are expected to act rationally, but that we must 
first map out a person’s way of viewing the world before we can understand the boundaries of rational 
behavior for that particular person64,65. In other words, a person’s rationality may be different than 
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your own. Since rationality is not thought to be universal, unlike many structural theories assume, the 
scholar must work extra hard to get inside the heads of individual leaders. The operational code 
analysis utilized here approaches this issue by answering questions about a research subject’s 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The first set of questions guide a research subject’s way of 
determining which actions to take. The latter addresses what a person believes to be the best strategy 
and tactics for achieving his goals.66,67 
 
3.3. Bridging the System Level and the Agent Centered Approaches 
System level analysis on one hand and individual leader level analysis (including cognitive analysis) 
on the other both contribute greatly to the field of International Relations and have earned their places. 
But they should not be viewed as two mutually exclusive methods of analysis. Daniel L. Byman and 
Kenneth M. Pollack argue that by only focusing on the system level, scholars end up missing the 
bigger picture. At the same time, the study of individuals on its own makes no sense. It must be a part 
of the larger whole to fully give credit to the complexity of international relations. Accepting this way 
of thinking makes the job of a scholar more difficult because it calls for the introduction of new tools 
such as biography and psychology.68 Similarly, Schafer and Walker have argued, that the operational 
code analysis could enrich Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism and that the system level 
and agent centered approaches could achieve great results together69.  
 
As an example, Neoclassical realists have embraced both levels. They have resolved the power 
struggle between these two levels of analysis by assigning primary importance to the system level. 
Stephen Benedict Dyson, a proponent of this school of thought argues that personalities matter a great 
deal when it comes to foreign policy analysis; their goals, perceptions and decision style are all 
significant. However, in the Neoclassical realist view these issues come into play after considerations 
of the international system and power have first been taken into account.70 Gideon Rose, the father 
of the Neoclassical realist school writes that, “the Neoclassical realists believe, that understanding 
the links between power and policy requires close examination of the contexts within which foreign 
policies are formulated and implemented.”71 
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The Neoclassical realist schools’ logic is simple: internal factors (the intervening variable) are 
considered after systemic incentives (independent variable) are first taken into account. After these 
two levels are both accounted for in the right order, we finally can see how foreign policy has come 
to be.72 This means that systemic incentives do not directly translate into foreign policy, but that there 
is an important, added layer called internal factors that acts as a filter through which all considerations 
of foreign policy must go before realizing their final form. This filter may include different ideational, 
psychological or cultural factors which in turn influence leaders’ perceptions of their own vis-à-vis 
other’s capabilities in the international arena.73  
 
The logic of Neoclassical realism guarantees that we are able to study issues at the micro level and 
yet take the macro level into consideration without having to treat these two levels as completely 
separate. The realities from the macro that cannot be ignored follow to the micro and not vice versa. 
However, the intervening variables are important to study too, since they are the ones that ultimately 
will give final (foreign policy) outcomes their form.  
 
This thesis does not directly utilize Neoclassical realism, but it is important to keep in mind a bigger 
picture into which the following analysis can be placed in the wider arena of international relations. 
A similar discussion could have been had in the context of Liberal or Constructivist schools. 
Understanding this context is vital to understanding the interplay between the different levels of 
analysis in this study, even though digging deeper into the structure level would be outside the scope 
of this thesis.  
 
Russia is a great power led by very few and powerful individuals. Yet as a great power and a former 
superpower, issues such as balance of power, geopolitics and other system incentives should never 
be dismissed. This study attempts to draw light to an interesting personality not often talked about, 
and how he is closely linked to Russian foreign policy formulation. When this study is read and 
understood in the context mapped out above, it will be very useful and provide complementary 
information for the field of International Relations and foreign policy analysis.  
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4. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT  
It has been established that personalities and leaders matter when studying International Relations, 
especially when it comes to foreign policy formulation. Once this is accepted, we must also take into 
consideration various aspects of individual characteristics, such as beliefs. This thesis pulls all of this 
together to create Yevgeny Primakov’s operational code. So, before proceeding any further, it is 
necessary to briefly take a look at the most influential foreign policy schools of thought in Russia and 
what some of these “beliefs” mean in that context. A primer on these schools provides a basis from 
which one can differentiate some of Primakov’s beliefs versus his peers and rivals, as well as provide 
context for current trends in Russian foreign policy debates. Classifications are many, but generally 
speaking most of them describe distinct groups with their own justifications for their views. Below is 
a discussion of some of these classifications and groups. The most useful classifications for this 
research were termed by Andrei Tsygankov who groups the schools of thought into Civilizationism, 
Westernism and Statism. In addition, other somewhat different subgroups within these have been 
categorized and will be discussed.  
 
4.1. Civilizationism 
Civilizationism is the oldest of the Russian foreign policy schools of thought, dating back to the time 
of Ivan the Terrible and the Mongol conquests74. This view holds Russia as a separate civilization 
possessing a unique set of values different from those in either Europe or Asia. Its adherents highlight 
an active struggle between themselves and the West.75 Russia is not viewed as a passive player in 
world politics, but as one having a specific mission to carry out. This includes spreading Russian 
values abroad and aggressively responding to security threats76.  
 
In the nineteenth century, Russian identity as an empire was embraced by the czars who attempted 
expansion, but who also championed Pan-Slavism77. In the early Soviet era Civilizationists called for 
a world revolution as a direct means of challenging the West78. Later on, they justified the Soviet 
Union’s own expansionist behavior by arguing that they, as a superior civilization, were merely 
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fighting the decadent West’s imperialist attempts79. Eurasianism, another expression of 
Civilizationism sees Russia as an expanding land power engaged in a struggle against sea powers80. 
These groups hold the ideas that Russia has a unique destiny which translates into, for example, 
dominating Central Asia and the Caucasus and opposing American strategic control and liberal values 
from encroaching into Russia’s sphere81. 
 
Civilizationist type thinkers can also be called “Russian nationalists” who in turn could be grouped 
into Neo-Imperialists, proponents of a Russian sphere of influence, and ethnic nationalists according 
to the classification constructed by Kuchins and Zevelev82. These groups are interested either in 
physically integrating more land into the Russian state or adding more countries as dependent 
satellites into the Russian sphere of influence. Russian nationalists tend to look back in history for 
inspiration. They see no need for Russia to try to become a vibrant 21st century country like the 
Westernists would. A good example of a Civilizationist/Russian nationalist in today’s politics is the 
founder and head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.83 
 
4.2. Westernism 
Unlike both Civilizationists, and to some degree Statists, Westernists do not see Russia as being in a 
conflict with the West. Instead, the West is viewed as the most advanced civilization in the world, 
and something to be mimicked rather than despised or feared. Westernists do not see Russians as an 
independent entity distinct from both the East and the West like Statists do (see below). Nor do they 
view it as an isolated and separate civilization of its own like the Civilizationists do. Rather, they 
view Russia as a part of the West and promote deeper integration with it.84 Members of this school 
of thought can also be called “zapadniki” or “Atlanticists”85 but this thesis will utilize Andrei 
Tsygankov’s terminology and simply refer to them as Westernists.  
 
                                                 
79 Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 25-26. 
80 Ibid., 26. 
81 Kasymov, “Statism in Russia,” 61. 
82 Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev, “Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change,” The Washington 
Quarterly 35, no. 1 (February 2012): 151. 
83 Ibid.,” 151. 
84 Andrei Tsygaknov and Pavel Tsygankov, “National ideology and IR theory: Three incarnations of the ‘Russian 
idea’,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 668, 607. 
85 Robert Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 111. 
 19 
This kind of Western-oriented thinking in Russia dates back to Peter the Great and his military 
reforms. He found Russia technologically lacking and borrowed Western technology to advance his 
modernization efforts.86 In addition to military reforms, Peter the Great also set forth other reforms 
that would turn the whole country upside down in a matter of just a few years. These reforms 
Europeanized the whole Russian society from military affairs, bureaucracy, industry, to elite dress, 
manners and language. A new capital bearing Peter’s name was built closer to mainland Europe in 
the spirit of these reforms. And finally, when Russia emerged victoriously from the Northern War, 
his empire would be counted among European powers deserving of equal respect.87 Some Westernists 
have also argued that Russia’s distance from Europe does not matter and that the country must be a 
part of it since the ideals of progress and prosperity are so strongly identified with Europe88. 
 
Gorbachev could also be included in the Westernist school because of his reformist New Thinking 
policies that called for cooperation with the West and being counted as an equal member among 
them89.  His New Thinking included ideas such as defending universal values, recognizing the fact 
that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent and that since peace is the most important 
issue, a nuclear war must be avoided. These could be achieved though deeper cooperation with the 
United States and the rest of the world.90 One of the most prominent Westernists in Russia was 
Andrey Kozyrev, the Federation’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs under Yeltsin’s presidency who 
also was Yevgeny Primakov’s predecessor91. He was much more radical and pro-Western than 
Gorbachev ever was and he decided to completely leave behind the old Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
For example, he discussed integrating Russia into the democratic West, promoted independence and 
sovereignty in the old Soviet Republics and considered cutting defense spending because the West 
was no longer seen as a threat92. However, this pro-Western phase among Russia’s top leadership 
was short lived. In fact, it had already lost its momentum by the mid-1990s.93 
 
Yeltsin and Kozyrev had assumed that due to Russia’s newfound Westernist move, the West would 
accept Russia as one of its own and help it in the process. This policy did not work as desired, and 
popular support for it started to decline quickly. Some adjustments were made, but they did not seem 
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to be enough.94 Soon both Statists and Civilizationist had more viable foreign policy suggestions and 
started to win ground95. Their arguments seemed to make more and more sense as, for example, 
NATO started expansion without including or consulting Russia. By 1993 it started to become clearer 
that the sought-after integration with the West was not going to happen in the desired way and other 
Westernist goals started to seem more and more naïve. In the December elections that year the 
Russian popular support shifted towards the opposition.96 A strong sentiment was that Westernists 
had disregarded Russian national interests in hopes of achieving something that they never did. 
Instead, the West seemed to have solely wanted to keep the new Russian Federation from becoming 
a new threat.97 This provided Yevgeny Primakov with an important opening. Had the Westernists 
been more successful, Primakov would most likely have been relegated to the past and associated 
only with the Soviet system.  
 
According to Kuchins and Zevelev, Westernizers can also be described as “Liberals” who focus on 
globalization, collective security and international organization membership. Since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Liberals have focused on different issues at different times, but when it comes to 
foreign policy formulation, Liberals too, have lost their influence. Today the only Liberals who still 
believe in their cause have become opposition voices such as Garry Kasparov and Boris Nemtsov.98 
  
4.3. Statism 
When the Westernist school lost its prominence in the mid 1990s, one result was that Kozyrev was 
replaced by Yevgeny Primakov as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and who Tsygankov calls the father 
of Russia’s new Statism. Primakov had previously loudly criticized the Westernist foreign policy 
strategies and now had a chance to try out his own.99 
 
Statists want Russia to be a strong and independent great power able to maintain order and keep the 
country safe from threats coming from both the west and the east. However, unlike Civilizationism, 
it is not inherently anti-West by its nature.100 Rather, Statist prefer “Derzhava” a term referring to 
Russia’s role as the holder of the international equilibrium of power. They believe that Russian 
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geopolitical interests and material interest in general should be safeguarded. In addition, they support 
keeping the near abroad areas close and see them as a vital interest for the Federation.101 
 
Kuchins and Zevelev call Tsygankov’s Statists “Great Power Balancers” and they point to Yevgeny 
Primakov as the founding father of this foreign policy school of thought. He is described as Russia’s 
Henry Kissinger. Consequently, Statists see Russia as a great power that needs to balance against the 
West, which in turn is seen as overplaying their role in the world. However, since Statists believe that 
Russia could learn from the West they are not inherently anti-West like Civilizationists are. 102 
 
Unlike Westernists, they believe that in order for Russia to occupy its rightful place in world politics, 
the role of the West must by definition diminish to give way for Russia. This stems from their belief 
in different power centers in international politics, a concept that Primakov returns to again and again 
in his writings. Unlike the Westernists/Liberals and Civilizationists/Russian nationalists, 
Statists/Great Power Balancers currently possess a primary role in Russian foreign policy 
formulation.103 Today the most significant proponent of this policy school of though is Vladimir 
Putin, but as Kuchins and Zevelev show in their research Putin has to some extent also been 
influenced by Russian nationalists104. Others agree that Putin can in fact be viewed as a Statist with 
some Civilizationist/Russian nationalist elements influencing his thinking.105 
 
Understanding Civilizationism, Westernism and Statism are key factors for understanding Russian 
foreign policy debates now and in the past. Earlier it was established that individual leaders and their 
beliefs influence the way international relations are conducted and how policies are formulated. All 
three of these schools of thought are established belief systems that Russian leaders have been 
influenced by. Yevgeny Primakov revived and reinvented the Statist school’s ideas into the dominant 
viewpoint in Russia today. Primakov’s association with Statism formed part of his worldview. Next, 
we will dig into his early life, career and introduce his most famous policy suggestion, multipolarity, 
before beginning to investigate his operational code in more detail.  
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5. YEVGENY PRIMAKOV 
Yevgeny Primakov is a man who during his lifetime saw the transition of the Soviet Union into the 
Russian Federation and who held many important positions in both political systems. As a leader he 
helped Russia navigate through some of its most difficult times in recent history. Even when his 
active years as a politician were over, he remained in the shadows influencing Russian foreign policy 
until his death in 2015. It is true that there are many other foreign policy figures, schools of thought 
and ideologies, which have influenced Russian leaders and it is possible that in the future Russia will 
go back to being more Westernist or perhaps hardline Civilizationists/Nationalists will gain more 
power. Anything can happen and much of it will depend on the direction the Russian economy takes. 
However, Primakov has contributed greatly to the formulation of Russian foreign policy. As long as 
Statism remains the major school of thought in Kremlin, his ideas should interest students of Russian 
policy. For example, Henry Kissinger has shed light on his significance in a foreword he wrote for A 
World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century one of Primakov’s books in 2004.  
His world view clearly reflects mainstream Russian thinking— with all its complexities— on 
Russia’s place in the twenty-first-century international system. This thinking is not always 
well understood outside Russia, and some of its elements are clearly not in full alignment with 
American interests and values. But so long as Russia remains a serious power that can affect 
vital U.S. objectives in areas such as the war on terrorism and nonproliferation, Russian views 
do matter and should be understood and, where appropriate, taken into account in order to 
make American foreign policy more effective.106 
 
5.1. Early Life 
Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov was born in Kiev in 1929, but grew up in Tbilisi, Georgia.107 His 
mother was a physician and father a Soviet military man who was executed.108,109 Primakov says that 
he did not know his father and thus was raised by his mother whose last name he carries. His 
grandmother was Jewish and at some point in his career he experienced suspiciousness and some 
level of persecution because of this connection.110 Many of his mother’s relatives were executed 
during Stalin’s purges leaving her disillusioned about the supreme leader who she called “a bastard 
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and a primitive murderer” 111 to the horror of young Yevgeny who never dared to revisit the subject. 
Despite his family background, Primakov did not shy away from politics.  
 
Primakov went to the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies where he graduated in 1953 as an Arabist, 
which explains his future interest and expertise in the Middle East.112 Later he defended his 
dissertation about capital exports into Arab countries at the Moscow State University at the Economic 
Faculty.113 For the better part of the 1960s, Primakov worked for the prominent newspaper Pravda 
(“truth”) as a Middle East correspondent. In his own words this was a position he was transferred to 
and was not his own idea, but he does not give further explanation for what exactly he means by 
this.114,115  
 
5.2. Career Highlights 
In the 1970s and mid-to-late 1980s Primakov held the position of Deputy Director and then Director 
of the current Yevgeny Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO), which he seems to be quite proud of based on his memoirs116,117. Primakov 
characterizes the institute as a place that formulated new and fresh ideas and approaches. They for 
example got in trouble for projecting that the capitalist world would not have ceased to exist by the 
year 2000 and then again when they claimed that capitalism was subject to change.118 Due to the 
institute’s radical views, staff faced persecution together with scientists in general before the 
Gorbachev years. Primakov was very upset with these developments and the closed-mindedness of 
many old guard forces behind it.119  
 
Primakov himself writes,  
we realized the need to abandon the dogmatic approach in both foreign policy and the 
military-political area. In this connection a theoretical interpretation of the peaceful 
coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems became a priority issue. Traditionally it was 
regarded as a “respite” in the relations between socialism and capitalism in the international 
arena. But with the development of nuclear weapons by both sides, weapons capable of 
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destroying not only the two superpowers but the rest of the world with them, peaceful 
coexistence between the two systems came to be treated as a more or less permanent 
condition. But we never failed to add that it by no means took the edge off the ideological 
struggle.120 
 
The Institute, together with other scientific centers, explored new foreign policy approaches that were 
hoped to “overcome tendencies that could lead to a thermonuclear war and at the same time to bring 
adequate defense spending into balance with the resources required to expand civilian production and 
develop the social sphere in the USSR.”121 A new term was coined: “reasonable sufficiency” that was 
contrary to the old approach that had put incredible strain on the economy by overemphasizing the 
role of the military-industrial complex and demanded matching every move the US made in like 
fashion122. Primakov writes that,  
the USSR’s economy could not withstand the arms race under the rules we had accepted. 
IMEMO and a number of other institutes under the Academy of Sciences were scrupulously 
analyzing the activity of the United Nations, which in our opinion was to play an extremely 
active role in establishing a new world order. We were already considering various options 
for reforming the U.N. so that it could adapt to future realities.123  
 
Yevgeny Primakov wrote later in his memoir that even as the Cold War was drawing to an end he 
supported the changes gladly. 
Yes, some lived in the past and even dreamed of returning to the days when the KGB 
practically controlled the country. But they were in the minority. The majority, to which I 
belonged, sincerely welcomed the changes, the spread of democracy and rejection of 
ideological fetters. This mood did not imply indiscriminate rejection of everything in the past 
or the naive notion that confrontation between the states had disappeared with the end of the 
Cold War. The substance and the form of that confrontation had changed, however, and those 
changes had to be recognized.124 
 
It is very important to understand Primakov’s mixed feelings about the end of the Cold War and the 
demise of the Soviet Union. It is perhaps fair to argue that Primakov, like many other Russians, was 
traumatized by the events that followed the fall of the old superpower. He makes it very clear that no 
one lost the Cold War, but everyone came out as winners125. Primakov makes the argument that a 
winner/looser way of thinking is based on the illusion that “some countries emerged from the Cold 
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War as victors, and some as losers. It is not that way. Nations on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ 
through common efforts have saved themselves from the policy of confrontation.”126 
 
During the closing years of Soviet power, Primakov saw first-hand how Gorbachev tried to ease 
tensions between the two Cold War rivals. As a diplomat, he attended many high-level meetings with 
the American President Ronald Reagan. This exposure must have influenced his later views about 
the United States. He seems to suggest that Russians came to the talks with an open mind, but the 
Americans could not quite do the same127,128. These turbulent years were very difficult for him and 
left him feeling that Russia had been mistreated, especially by the United States. He was actively 
involved in trying to fix Russia’s weak situation and experienced first-hand the embarrassment of 
having to receive help from the United States. In response to it weakness, Russia was, in his view, 
treated in a disrespectful and demeaning way adding salt to his wounds.129 Russia was also given a 
backseat in the post-Soviet era and not included in decision-making processes in the international 
arena, as if they no longer mattered. To make matters worse, this attitude was also accepted and 
adopted by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev of the liberal Westernist camp.130 
 
In one of his books, Primakov laments the situation. 
Development after the Cold War might have been less chaotic and more harmonious, but such 
was not to be. The two former Cold War adversaries might have cooperated to work on 
formulating common policies. Instead, there was a period when Russia seemed to be relegated 
to taking only a supporting role. As the Russian Federation struggled to establish itself as an 
independent country after the fall of the USSR, this back-seat stance was advocated by the 
Foreign Minister at the time, who expressed it this way: he said the world was divided into 
the civilized part and the ‘riff-raff’. After losing the Cold War, Russia needed to make sure it 
gained admittance into the club of civilized countries by following their rules. The leader of 
this club, of course, was the United States. This approach was not sustainable.131 
 
Primakov held many positions in different types of environments before entering the prime-time 
political scene, but all through his career he was very much oriented towards foreign policy.132, 133 He 
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acted as a director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (when it ceased to be the KGB) after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. And, once Andrey Kozyrev’s Westernist policies had failed and the 
administration looked for new directions, Yeltsin appointed Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in 1996.134 The change towards Statism took place partly because a changing security environment 
was taking shape and thus more emphasis was placed on great power thinking135. After being 
appointed, Primakov stated that he considered his main task to be making sure the Foreign Ministry 
would better protect national interests136. This was a major shift, since Kozyrev had not placed much 
value on Russian interests, a fact that greatly perplexed Primakov137. 
 
For many Russians, seeing Primakov replace Kozyrev was a relief, putting an end to a Westernist era 
and changing Russia’s foreign policy objectives.138 Primakov held very different views on Russian 
interests, and what their relations with the West should look like. He was personally a realist and a 
Statist and would execute pragmatic foreign policy that attempted to look for the middle road. He did 
not seek confrontation with the West, but was not pro-Western either.139,140,141 Additionally, he 
understood how weak Russia was, but wanted to restore its place in the world.142 Interestingly, 
Primakov was the only person who was able to work at the top levels of both the Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin administrations and continue to succeed143, 144. 
 
Primakov’s appointment as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs aroused a lot of interest, not only 
because he was very different from Kozyrev, but also since in the past he had not been in the direct 
public eye. His exact political leanings were a bit unclear. Some indications of his policies at the time 
could be derived from unclassified Foreign Intelligence Service reports which were written under the 
leadership of Primakov. These documents dealt with suggestions for Russian foreign policy doctrine 
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with moderate great power tones detected.145 Some in the West greeted the news of his appointment 
with uneasiness because of his background. In an interview Primakov described these feelings, “some 
people in the West consider me a conservative thinker, sometimes even a hard-liner. Granted, not in 
form but in substance. I do not disavow such descriptions, since I see nothing shameful in them.”146 
No wonder people were asking questions about his policies, since he was never very effervescent by 
nature. One article written at the time describes him preferring to operate from the shadows, being 
professionally unsociable, yet possessing personal charm and an ability to win people over147. Neither 
was he excessively talkative about his preferences. He, for example, made it clear that he was not 
going to say anything negative about Kozyrev, his predecessor and a man he clearly did not often 
agree with148. 
 
In 1998 Primakov became the Prime Minister and it is said that this was the point when Russian 
foreign policy became truly Russian149. As Prime Minister Primakov became very popular. Even 
though before this point he was not considered a possible Yeltsin heir, he became one. This, however, 
made Yeltsin jealous.150 Primakov’s Prime Ministership was short lived and Yeltsin fired him already 
in 1999 because he was too popular151. It did not help Primakov that Yeltsin’s own popularity was in 
decline152. The fact that 81% of Russians disapproved of the firing shows how liked Primakov was 
among the public153. Additionally, Primakov was viewed as a viable option to be the next president 
by many154. However, in the end he decided to rally behind Putin and once he was elected, would 
frequently visit the new president. Putin then continued with a foreign policy that was quite similar 
to Primakov’s.155, 156  
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Yevgeny Primakov himself has stated that he had no chance of winning in the presidential elections 
since the mass media back then was manipulated against him by forces that did not want him to 
succeed157. This shows his realism, and perhaps his preference to pull strings in the background, 
rather than possessing the need to occupy a specific public office at any cost. Primakov writes in his 
memoir that he and Putin developed a warm relationship before the later was elected president. He 
implies that this made it easier for him to not participate in the race himself. Primakov goes into much 
detail describing Putin’s policies and his actions as the president. He clearly says that he likes Putin 
as an individual and that he thinks he has done good things for Russia, even though sometimes his 
good policies are not carried out the right way, mostly because of those around him. Primakov 
addresses many major criticisms of Putin, such as his supposed dictatorial rule, but explains away 
these accusations as merely propaganda or misconceptions. He praises Putin for having succeeded in 
shaking off any ties to those who helped him to rise to his position (the so called “Family”, a force 
and group of oligarchs also behind Yeltsin). Overall, Primakov seems to believe that Putin is merely 
a human being, but having taken that into consideration, Russia could not have a better president.158 
He puts it like this, “the majority of thinking Russians understand that Putin is the best person to lead 
Russia today.”159 
 
5.3. Yevgeny Primakov, Multipolarity and the New World Order 
Before proceeding to construct Primakov’s operational code, it is necessary to briefly introduce his 
concept of multipolarity and the new world order. It is perhaps the centerpiece of Primakov’s thinking 
and one which will be referred to numerous times in the following sections.  
 
5.3.1. The Cold War and Development Towards the New World Order 
During the Cold War much of the world was divided into blocs dominated by either the United States 
or the Soviet Union. These countries were both superpowers, but once the Cold War drew to an end 
Primakov insists superpowers also ceased to exist.160 Part of the argument is based on the idea that 
many countries no longer needed to rely on their old protectors; mostly the Soviet Union and to a 
lesser degree also the United States. For example, Western Europe stopped relying on the American 
nuclear umbrella because of the change in the security environment161. Most significantly, the world 
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started to slowly move from a bipolar system into a multipolar one162. According to Primakov, it is 
wrong to assume that some countries lost and others won at the break-up of the old world order. What 
really happened in his mind was that “nations on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ through common 
efforts have saved themselves from the policy of confrontation”163. When this is held to be a fact, one 
must then also accept that in the new system there should be no division into leaders and followers164.  
 
Primakov lamented that Cold War thinking still marked international relations and doctrines, coupled 
with the insistence that some had indeed emerged as winners165. Primakov especially blamed 
American “neocons” for working against progress towards a multipolar world. The neoconservatives’ 
idea is the polar opposite: superpower ideology mixed with unilateralism.166 Primakov believed 
monopolarity and unilateralism form the worst recipe for the world, provoking rivalry and chaos167. 
Multipolarity, where there are many centers of power instead of just one was a better alternative in 
his mind. He is not alone with his ideas. In a speech in 2016 Vladimir Putin praised Primakov for his 
multipolarity concept. According to him, after seeing the first signs of a new unipolar world forming, 
Primakov “had truly strategic vision that enabled to look into the future and see how unviable and 
one-sided this unipolar model was.”168 
 
5.3.2. The United States and the New World Order 
It is clear that Primakov thought the United States of America was Russia’s main rival and that the 
United State’s influence had to be undermined to lessen and balance their influence in world 
politics.169 Primakov supported the creation of “the Big Triangle” (Russia, India and China) which 
started the RIC. It then became BRIC (add Brazil) and later BRICS (add South Africa). The rationale 
behind this creation was to counterbalance NATO and the United States more specifically in order to 
make the world’s division of power more equal.170 Primakov also believed in diversifying Russian 
relations with other countries by maintaining good relations with many Asian and Middle Eastern 
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states. In the Middle East, which he was an expert in, he differentiated between Muslim states and 
Muslim extremists. He wanted to have good relations with the official states in order to balance 
against extremism and Western influences in the area.171 
 
Given that Primakov’s ideas were more pragmatic and less ideological than Communist foreign 
policy was, they should not be understood as inherently anti-Western.172 The collapse of the USSR 
destroyed the bi-polar world and American hegemony emerged instead. Primakov’s understanding 
of Russia being a great power simply means that Russia must get back in the game and fix the current 
imbalances; creating a counterbalance to the United States (not the West per se). According to 
Primakov, the new world order is understood in terms of the interactions of the main actors which 
are: Russia, Japan, China, the United States and integrated Europe.173 Thus, the old distinction 
between Communism and Capitalism, the West and the Soviet bloc does not exist in Primakov’s 
thinking.  
 
Although the times of perpetual confrontation were over, certain old problems combined with new 
ones had to be given serious thought by the whole world community. Yevgeny Primakov found the 
problems around regional conflicts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to be some of the 
worst issues the world was facing in the post-Cold War era174. He believed that in today’s world all 
centers of the world should join their forces and collaborate to oppose these unfortunate issues faced 
by all. Despite the fact that the new situation was everyone’s problem, Primakov felt that through 
their actions the United States had demonstrated it had little interest in joining this movement and 
instead acted unilaterally for their own benefit. This American attitude, combined with an almost 
unjust position as a hegemon as Primakov viewed it, was something that he always found irritating 
about the United States.  
 
5.3.3. A New Role for Russia and the United Nations 
Primakov argued that Russia shared the interests of the majority of the world community after the 
Cold War: security, stability and peace175. He was also adamant that Russia would become one of the 
major centers of the new multipolar world despite certain developmental issues they might have been 
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struggling with 176,177. These “centers” would arise naturally as power was distributed after the fall of 
the bi-polar system and would center around several large countries. What is more, Russia would not 
agree to be treated as a second-class power and accept a supporting role.178 Primakov hoped that 
Russia would act as a counterbalance to the negative trends in the transitional period, such as certain 
countries trying to dominate the system before all the centers have fully established themselves179. 
These other centers could be, for example, China, India and the EU180. 
 
Furthermore, Primakov wanted the United Nations to establish a role as the most important 
international organization dealing with security. He argued,  
given the full importance of bi-lateral relations and regional organizations, the main 
mechanism capable of ensuring the unimpeded transition from the bi-polar, confrontational 
to a multi-polar, democratic world is the United Nations Organization. During the 
establishment of a multi-polar system, it is called upon to become a unique ‘safety net’, 
leading to a minimum of destructive consequences from changes and channeling them into 
the evolutionary, democratic direction. The UN’s main task remains supporting international 
security.181  
 
Primakov would also have preferred if the new European security system would be based on the 
OSCE rather than NATO, because it was viewed a divisive remnant of the Cold War. He also did not 
want either NATO or the OSCE to absorb what he thought to be UN functions.182,183 
 
In short, Yevgeny Primakov hoped that the new world order after the tension-ridden years of the Cold 
War would have been marked by multilateralism in the form of multipolarity instead of American 
hegemony. He believed organizations such as the OSCE and the UN should be given a larger role 
and that Russia should assume a role of a balancer and a major center of power in the new system. 
The concept of multipolarity is a central part of Primakov’s thinking and will be touched upon 
frequently later on. In the following section, we will proceed to map out Yevgeny Primakov’s beliefs 
utilizing the ten question method and analyze his influence on the Russian Federation’s foreign policy 
development. 
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6. GEORGE’S TEN QUESTIONS AND PRIMAKOV’S OPERATIONAL 
CODE 
First, the five philosophical beliefs questions will be addressed and then the five instrumental 
questions. The philosophical questions deal directly with Yevgeny Primakov’s way of determining 
which actions to take. The next set of instrumental questions address what he believes to be the best 
strategy and tactics for achieving his political goals.184 Together, all of these questions are meant to 
produce new information about the research subject but piecing together an operational code is a 
developing story and some issues will be introduced in earlier questions and discussed in detail later 
on. Some repetition will thus inevitably take place. Once all questions are sufficiently answered, a 
section of analysis will follow in which the key elements are summarized and dissected.  
 
6.1. Philosophical Questions  
1. What Is the "Essential" Nature of Political Life? Is the Political Universe One of Harmony or Conflict? 
What Is the Fundamental Character of One's Political Opponents? 
 
6.1.1. Opponents 
Alexander George elaborates on this question by noting that 
a political actor’s belief system about the nature of politics is shaped particularly by his 
orientation to other political actors. Most important of these are one’s opponents. The way in 
which they are perceived – the characteristics the political actor attributes to his opponents – 
exercises a subtle influence on many other philosophical and instrumental beliefs in his 
operational code.185                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
In Yevgeny Primakov’s mind, his personal opponents and Russia’s major opponents were on the one 
hand oligarchs who mostly influenced domestic affairs inside the country and the United States on 
the other. This does not necessarily mean that Primakov viewed the United States as an enemy per 
se, whereas he tended to treat oligarchs consistently in a much harsher way and viewed them as 
personal political enemies.  
 
Primakov was often personally opposed by either oligarchs or a force similar to them; the “Family” 
as Yeltsin’s inner circle was called186. According to Primakov, he was ousted from Yeltsin’s 
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administration by these forces when they realized that he was going to oppose corruption and 
economic crimes187. He was determined to lock up people who were involved in such crimes, both 
government officials and oligarchs. Due to this, he was accused of taking Russia back to the times of 
the Great Purges in 1937 and apparently forged documents were presented in public to make the case 
for his removal more believable, hurting Primakov’s image. Boris Berezovsky, an oligarch, was 
responsible for much of the dirt campaign waged against Primakov. This and other related issues 
resulted in the Family strong-arming Yeltsin into finally firing him.188  
 
Based on the materials researched it could be argued that for Primakov opponents were those who 
wanted to selfishly and arrogantly force their own will on others without regard to the bigger picture, 
even against their own good. This view applies narrowly to individuals and more broadly to entire 
countries. Among his opponents could be counted those countries and entities that choose to act 
unilaterally, only caring for their own interests, such as the United States. These forces strove to 
oppose the formulation of a new, more stable post-Cold War world order which was fairer, conflict 
free, democratic and one in which Russia had a say. 
 
Yevgeny Primakov found especially troubling those who he believed disregarded all that Russia had 
done to distance itself from the past and to create a new, bright future; wanting instead to continue 
living as if things had not changed at all. According to Primakov, those who thought this way were 
still stuck in the Cold War era way of thinking. They had not woken up to the new era that started in 
the 1990s but continued to view the world as divided into blocks.189 They saw Russia as an enemy, 
which in Primakov’s opinion was ridiculous. He thought that due to the changes in the international 
system and Russia’s democratization, it is mindless to view Russia as a threat to any other country.190  
 
As an example, Primakov writes,  
the North Atlantic Alliance is creeping to our borders – this cannot but cause alarm. What is 
more that process is accompanied with anti-Russian rhetoric and the U.S fairly aggressive 
policies in the Soviet successor states. From Moscow this looks as a manifestation of 
discontent and irritation among certain Western circles with the fact that Russia while 
restoring its vast and promising potential is restoring its great power status as well. ---- I think 
that the West should ponder on Russia’s role and place in the contemporary world; they should 
finally discard an image of Russia as a country that uses its energy resources as an instrument 
of imperialist policies. This is a wrong image. Real Russia has no intention to take orders from 
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any other country, yet it is prepared to pool efforts with other states to combat international 
terrorism and WMD proliferation; it refuses to accept the idea of the world divided by 
civilizational or religious features; it is prepared to tap its unique potentials to cope with the 
volatile Mid-Eastern crisis. I am speaking of Russia that is pursuing a policy designed to cool 
the hotheads that failed to draw the lessons of the Iraqi adventure and are prepared to use the 
same disastrous tactics against other objectionable regimes.191 
 
One way the world changed after the Cold War, according to Primakov, was the disappearance of 
permanent adversaries. In the new system enemies could appear wherever interests conflicted, but 
Primakov noted that also the field of mutual interests had expanded at the same time.192 This shows 
that a friend today may become an enemy tomorrow and vice versa.  
 
So, Primakov’s opponents included: the United States and their actions in the wider world, oligarchs 
inside Russia and corrupt officials who through their pursuit of their own goals destroy the new and 
improved Russia. It is justified to argue that the United States was often viewed as an opponent in 
Primakov’s mind, but it would not be fair to omit the fact that Primakov did want to cooperate with 
them whenever possible and he applauded Vladimir Putin for being able to find ways to do so193.  
 
6.1.2. Harmony or Conflict? 
It can be deduced from Primakov’s texts and interviews, that he viewed the world as being in a state 
of conflict. This was partly because of the United States and its unilateralism. He believed that ever 
since the end of the Cold War, when the era of bipolarity came to an end, the international system 
had been transitioning towards a new system of multipolarity. While the old order was characterized 
by ideological and military confrontation, new threats had emerged. These threats included regional 
conflicts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, all of which have not yet been addressed 
properly and therefore peace and stability have not descended on earth.194,195 
 
Primakov made it abundantly clear throughout his speeches and texts that neither Russia nor the 
United States can any longer be characterized as superpowers. He says, “only the strongest states able 
to keep together a conglomerate of other states, ensure their safety and impose its own rules on them 
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can be called superpowers.”196 He further argues that even though the Unites States after the Cold 
War was the strongest economically, politically and militarily,  
its qualitative descriptions do not fit the “superpower concept”. At the same time the Cold 
War inertia, part and parcel of U.S policies preserved, to a certain extent, the “superpower” 
definitions as applied to this country even though the objective conditions have 
disappeared.197 
 
Through this lens not only is the United States acting as if they still are a superpower when they are 
not, but they are also trying to actively interfere with the natural evolution towards a multipolar world 
and to maintain their dominance by bypassing the United Nations with “its continual assertions of its 
right to unilateral use of force.”198 This, Primakov finds especially maddening since in his view a 
multipolar world would be in the best interest of the whole world. He even makes a bold and almost 
arrogant claim that this would also be in the best interests for the United States itself. He continues 
by asserting that no other country approves of the push toward the unipolar world that the United 
States is advocating and, besides, in this “hypothetical” unipolar world no one could provide a 
counterbalance.199 
 
Thus, it can be argued that Yevgeny Primakov thought that the world is in a state of chaos and will 
remain so if the United States keeps behaving in a unilateral manner because, 
attempts to bind others with unilateral decisions only provokes rivalry and in the end a chaotic, 
unpredictable drift of international relations. It is the worst recipe for a world in which 
economic, ecological and humanitarian mutual dependency is growing rapidly.200  
 
Many issues would be better dealt with through cooperation and consensus201. Here Primakov sees a 
clear mission for Russia: “During the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world, Russia must 
play the role of a counterbalance to the negative trends that are manifesting themselves in 
international affairs.”202 
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Primakov believed a multipolar world where Russia is one of the major centers would become a 
reality203. And that it would be the best option for Russia204. Primakov was a firm believer in the fact 
that Russia, like most of the world, was mainly concerned about security, stability and peace205. In 
the late 1980s he wrote in the Pravda newspaper “one can frequently hear it said: From the first days 
of Soviet power, our country has been struggling for peace among peoples... peace remains the main 
goal of the USSR’s foreign policy.”206 Surely Primakov understood that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union caused harm to other nations during the Cold War, even though he refused to start 
a discussion about who was worse207. Yet, it could be argued that he seems to have thought that it 
was actually just the nature of the Cold War that caused the problems and that once it was over 
everyone won.208 Russia transformed itself dramatically, but the United States continued living as if 
they were now the top dog and went on with their Cold War era attitudes and policies.209 Primakov 
probably kept on insisting that the USSR had not lost the war since he insisted that Soviet policy 
makers, himself included, saw the madness of the philosophy of confrontation and the possibility of 
a thermonuclear war and that they in fact came to their senses first and developed new peaceful 
attitudes (that ultimately made them “lose” the war). It is hard to say whether he truly believes the 
storyline “of no one lost, because we came to our right senses” (or something in between), but he is 
consistent about it throughout his texts.210 
 
The problem about Russia’s position as a member of the new club of major powers, according to 
Primakov, is that Russia is not being considered as an equal despite being the second largest nuclear 
power, their (recovering) economic and human potential, their size and resources and their unique 
position bridging two continents. Russia was not included in the club after the Cold War by other 
developed countries who were only concerned about, “pushing their own agenda and national 
interests to the exclusion of all else.”211 Had Russia been listened to, developments would have been 
“less chaotic and more harmonious, but such was not to be.”212 Instead, Russia was given a backseat 
which, at the time, was also supported by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev.  
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This approach to Russian foreign policy, however, was not sustainable and Primakov asserted that, 
“it is not appropriate for Russia to be relegated to playing a supporting role in world events.”213 He 
did not think that this would inevitably lead to continued tensions between the United States and 
Russia. Confrontation was avoidable, “but only if Washington fully grasps how futile and 
counterproductive it is to try to turn Russia into a vassal subservient to U.S policy and will.”214 
Primakov wanted to see both countries cooperating for the common good, but in order for that to 
happen the United States would have had to help create a multipolar system and stop solving world 
issues by themselves while creating their own rules unilaterally. In his opinion, this option would 
have been ideal for pacifying a chaotic world, but Primakov expressed his doubts about its realism.215 
 
In 2004 Primakov outlined two scenarios for the first decade of the 21st century; one was unfavorable 
and the other favorable. According to the first scenario, the United States continues down the path of 
unilateral action, overstepping the UN and the rest of the world community, while continuing to 
deprive Russia of their place at the table helping make resolutions on varying world problems. Should 
this unfavorable situation materialize Russia would find itself forced into a corner trying to break free 
of their isolation and needing to protect their interests by means of tougher domestic and foreign 
policies. They would also have to look for new partners in China and India. Overall, the result of 
careless American decisions would lead to a new post-Cold War confrontation that would not go 
unnoticed around the world.216 
 
The second scenario is more benign, and the one Primakov prefers: steps towards the creation of a 
new world order are taken while mutual interests are accounted for. As mentioned above, these 
interests are fighting terrorism, dealing with regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and protecting the environment. Regional power centers would naturally emerge 
(multipolarity) and the major players, including Russia, would work out a common position leading 
to stability. Change would take place without conflict and force would only be used as a last resort 
with the permission of the UN Security Council. In fact, countries would join the United States and 
Russia in strategic arms reduction.217 
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With this scenario, the role of the UN is strengthened, and Russia and China are allowed to integrate 
into the world economy unhindered. In this new world order no civilizational divides between 
Muslims and Christians are allowed to take precedence and thus major civilizational splits are 
prohibited from emerging. This would, for example, mean that Muslims would be welcomed as 
partners to help fight terrorism. Primakov believed these were all positive and necessary 
developments towards the well-being and stability of the whole world and ones which the United 
States could not pursue on their own.218 
 
Consequently, Yevgeny Primakov believed in the possibility of both a chaotic and a harmonious 
world and that the actions of major players, such as the United States, determine which would 
eventually emerge. During the Cold War the system by nature was chaotic and volatile. Once the old 
system came to an end there was a good chance to create something new and more peaceful, where 
threats could be better managed. A new, harmonious world where some sort of an equilibrium could 
be achieved through multilateralism and multipolarity should be set as a goal. Policies that take 
everyone’s interests into account should be adopted. Russia according to Primakov was working hard 
to create a world such as this. Yet, something at the time that was slowing down developments 
towards Primakov’s ideal world order was a push toward a unipolar, American centered world which 
he thought was unacceptable to the rest of the world and would only cause a return to the era of global 
confrontation.  
 
To conclude, Primakov’s view on the state of the world could be characterized as being somewhere 
between chaotic and harmonious. He hoped it would develop into the direction of more harmony, but 
feared certain leaders, especially in the United States, would at least slow down this progress if not 
halt it completely.  
 
2. What Are the Prospects for the Eventual Realization of One's Fundamental Political Values and 
Aspirations? Can One Be Optimistic, Or Must One Be Pessimistic on This Score, And in What Respects 
the One And/or the Other? 
 
Primakov was not an ideologue and fancied himself a realist. He would not have set goals that he 
thought were unattainable. As a seasoned diplomat, he also understood that making progress takes 
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time and careful navigation between one’s own and others’ interests. His most significant political 
goal was the formation of a multipolar world in which Russia plays a significant role. He was fairly 
optimistic about reaching this goal but took into account possible resistance by other major players. 
This resistance was viewed as against the interests of the whole world community and, in the end, 
might destroy his plans as previously elaborated on.  
 
Yevgeny Primakov sketched out two likely scenarios in the world for the first decade of the 21 st 
century in his memoir Russian Crossroads, Toward the New Millennium. He wrote, “the future 
development of all major events in the international arena depends to a large extent on the course the 
United States steers toward Russia.” He believed that their relationship should not be tainted by the 
past, nor be a mere continuation of past practices since Russia had changed, and too often his 
countrymen have been misunderstood.219 It is difficult to say what kind of a veiled threat Primakov 
hides behind his words, especially when mentioning that the future of all major events in the 
international arena are up to how Russia is treated by the United States. The above quoted statement 
is a fundamental one, because it goes far beyond bilateral relations. It reveals Primakov’s belief that 
the way the United States treats Russia has major implications on Russian foreign policy as well as 
immense potential for both good and bad on third parties. At the same time, it shows that he is not 
completely positive about the realization of his aspirations for a multipolar world.  
 
Primakov often reminded his audience that although the United States has acted in a manner that 
Russia cannot approve of, Russia has not adopted an anti-American stance. They have only tried to 
facilitate cooperation whenever possible.220 He understood that a more aggressive stance would not 
be helpful to Russia, since it does not seem to be a popular policy. Aggression would only send many 
European countries, who have recently become more independent of the United States, back to its 
arms. Accommodating the United States whenever they can places Russia in a better position vis-á-
vis influencing their policies and helps Russia to maintain a stronger international role. This in turn 
keeps hopes alive for a better world for everyone.221 Primakov appears to make the argument that 
Russia’s misunderstood interests equal the world community’s interests, and that the interests of the 
United States are often harmful, even to themselves.  
Russia’s desire to play an active role in the global community should not be misinterpreted. 
Russia’s desire to keep its status as a great world power has absolutely nothing to do with 
aspirations for empire building, a motive that is occasionally attributed to us. Rather, this 
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desire stems from our knowledge that Russian foreign policy can do much to help stabilize 
conflict situations in regions around the world. Russia is certainly as interested in this as any 
other nation of the world, perhaps more so.222 
 
Overall, Primakov’s realism made him doubt the United States’ interest in supporting his preferred 
world order223. In particular he blamed American neoconservatives for their obsession with 
unilateralism224. However, the United States was not the only problem since he also blamed some 
other Western countries (without naming them) for trying to keep Russia from influencing 
developments outside its immediate borders225. Yet, Primakov remained hopeful that the world was 
still moving towards a multipolar world, one in which Russia would again become great and restore 
its place in world politics.  
 
It should be reiterated that the United States is not an evil empire in Primakov’s mind. However, he 
placed a huge emphasis on their responsibility to choose the right course, because he thought Russia 
had already done everything that it can, and more, to make the world a better place. The ball is now 
in the United States’ court.226 Additionally, he understood that Russia is no longer a superpower, but 
again he placed a disproportional emphasis on their significance in world affairs. It is as it he wanted 
to say, “We can do this the easy way or the hard way. Either case, if you choose wrong and we do 
not like it, the blood will be on your hands not ours.” It is clear that Primakov thought that if everyone 
wanted to do the right thing then his goals would be reached. If not, chaos would ensue. He is careful 
to never make direct threats and to rarely name exact Russian interests outside the obvious peace and 
stability that he kept repeating. In all his writing, he sounded like a career diplomat giving the 
impression that he is not saying everything he thinks.227 
 
In short, Primakov was often doubtful about the quick realization of his hopes for a multipolar world. 
He depicts the difficult position he finds Russian policymakers facing. In his words, all they want is 
to help stabilize the system, but their efforts are frustrated and misunderstood time and time again. 
Sometimes he is more hopeful, but when he feels less so he expresses veiled threats about how Russia 
could make life difficult for those who opposed his plans. It is also important to note that he sees 
Russian interests aligning with the interests of the whole world.  
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3. Is the Political Future Predictable? In What Sense and to What Extent? 
 
Yevgeny Primakov would probably have argued that surprises happen, but that you can expect to see 
certain events take place. People and countries can shape their destiny, but it is not entirely up to them 
because much depends on others. Primakov believed in certain historical trends whose organic 
fulfilment he expected to take place. For example, Primakov’s statements include ideas such as: 
Russia has been and remains a great power with a nuclear capability; Russia has historical ties with 
the Commonwealth of Independent States and Europe; and its unique geopolitical position between 
East and West allows it to work as a bridge between the two.228,229 For Primakov, these facts 
guaranteed Russia a special place in the world. Yet, he admitted that certain issues, such as the state 
of the Russian economy, are subject to fluctuations. The economy was in a rough shape during most 
of the 1990s and Primakov admitted that it negatively impacted the role Russia could play in world 
politics. Despite temporary setbacks, however, it was not enough to change Russia’s role as a 
significant player.230  
 
Primakov pointed out in one of his speeches in 1998, that the immediate years after the fall of the 
Soviet Union were not extraordinary in Russian history. Similar events had taken place in the mid 
1800s when Russia lost the Crimean War and was offered a reduced status. Then Foreign Minister 
Gorchakov refused to accept a lower rank and insisted that Russia could still act as a leading great 
power even after a devastating defeat. Primakov intended to do the same 200 years later. He argued, 
that Russia’s geopolitical position, nuclear arms, being a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, Russia’s economic potential, military production and simply its history and might make it 
an important leading state in the world regardless of short-term difficulties.231 
 
To show how exactly Primakov in his own words used this reasoning in relation to Russia’s interests, 
let us look at how he formulated an argument for Russia’s continued, significant role in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States after the fall of the Soviet Union.  
It would be quite naive to assume that Russia would stop playing that role. It is a case of 
historical patterns. History shows that Russia has never been a secondary power in a space 
that it, in fact, created. We should not ignore the fact that Russia created both the Russian 
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Empire with its periphery and the Soviet Union with its national republics. It was the center. 
Now it has a different role, of course. No one is talking about reviving the Soviet Union or 
the Russian Empire. But the Russian Federation is the most powerful entity in the post-Soviet 
space. It has the largest population and the largest territory in the CIS. Another point is also 
important. Although each people has its own culture and civilization, and we should not 
disdain them, Russian culture had the most substantial effect on the cultures of the national 
republics.232 
 
As mentioned before, Primakov depicted two alternative scenarios for the first decade of the 21 st 
century in his memoirs. For him, the difference between the two is mostly up to the behavior and 
choices of the United States.233 This is quite typical of Primakov. He also seems to have believed in 
solid historical trends based on past events and status, which he used especially to justify Russia’s 
current actions and demands in relation to Russian interests. Primakov, for example, has expressed 
that 
Russia has been and remains a sovereign state with an ancient and rich history. There is no 
doubt about this. The Russian state institutions are specific in the same way as the mentality 
of Russians and other peoples living in our country. When moving toward the universal 
human values and democracy Russia is following its own road determined by its traditions, 
the past, its multinational nature, and geography.234 
 
Yet, in other instances Primakov acknowledged that reality did not always correspond to his model 
and often pointed to the United States as the source of unpredictability. He understood that the United 
States was free and able to cause problems for Russia’s hopes for the future, but then fell back to his 
insistence on historical trends and how it is almost morally wrong to oppose his understanding of 
how events should progress. It seems that although he prided himself as an academic, he still liked to 
use arbitrary intellectual arguments that may conflict with his own logic used previously in other 
settings. It is as if he is at least subconsciously willing to build his arguments based on whatever suits 
his purposes at a given time. This is revisited in detail in the cognitive dissonance section below.  
 
Primakov was not against change, however. He seems to have welcomed the formation of the Russian 
Federation and European integration, both of which came as surprises to many235. Even so, he 
believed strongly in both historical continuity and the need to guide, influence and even control 
developments. That is the subject of the next question. Continuity of events could not be left to take 
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shape on their own and is discussed more below in question four to help shed light on Primakov’s 
seeming dualistic understanding of progress and development.    
 
Throughout his texts, Primakov discusses state interests extensively. Specific state interests dictate 
certain paths and directions that countries are expected to follow. In this sense, if we know about 
Russia’s national interests, we can predict their actions. For example, he often highlights mutual 
interests, but acknowledges that other states might work against Russian interests which would likely 
result in a conflict236,237. Elsewhere he stated that Russia has responded to the geopolitical changes 
around its borders in a much softer way than what would have been expected when the USSR was 
still around. He then added “but this should not be taken as a sign that Russia will not defend its 
national interests. Russia will continue to seek new ways to protect and achieve its interests that are 
more appropriate in today’s world.”238 
 
In summary, Primakov’s understanding of the predictability of the political future is more complex 
than meets the eye. On the one hand he holds on to historical continuity as something sacred 
especially when it has to do with Russia’s right to a great power status. In this instance going against 
the “inevitable” would put one almost in an immoral position and an example would be the United 
States disrupting developments towards a multipolar world. Yet on the other hand, Primakov was 
eager to see change when the continuation of old patterns would be less ideal for Russia’s interests. 
Finally, it can be argued that one predictable aspect of Primakov’s own world view and politics was 
that everything started with Russia’s interests and aspirations and all else, including supporting 
arguments, would follow as secondary. Now we will investigate question four to see in more detail 
how this reasoning and narrative construction is intended to play out.  
 
4. How Much "Control" or "Mastery" Can One Have Over Historical Development? What is One's Role 
in "Moving" And "Shaping" History in the Desired Direction? 
 
As was established before, Yevgeny Primakov believed in certain historical trends and constants, 
such as state interests, but also in the need to, and feasibility of, directly influencing events. When 
asked about why Russia would support specific presidential candidates in neighboring countries over 
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others, he answered that individuals are important and that their role in history is great239. This 
statement reveals two things. One, that he believed in the significance of individuals and their ability 
to influence developments. Two, he believed that the world cannot be left to take shape on its own; 
control and micromanaging are necessary to reach satisfactory results (despite his insistence on 
historical patterns in certain situations). First, we will focus on Primakov’s ideas about control and 
the importance of order on the domestic and micro levels. Then, we will proceed to answer the 
question at its intended macro level. Proceeding in this order is necessary, because Primakov had 
strong opinions on this issue when it comes to the domestic sphere which must be understood before 
discussing how they are linked to mastering historical developments on the macro level.  
 
6.1.3. The Micro Level 
Yevgeny Primakov was a supporter of significant state control over areas such as the economy. In 
one of his articles he wrote “after a long tug of war we have finally discarded the idea that at the dawn 
of the market economy, before a civilized market has become fully developed, the country can do 
well without the state’s purposeful interference in economy.”240 In the same article, written in 2006, 
he argued that state involvement in the economy was still badly needed and highlighted problems 
such as Russia’s demographic crisis and uncompetitive Russian products which could be fixed by 
more focus on innovation technologies. The government is needed to fix these issues, but also to 
make sure that growth benefits everyone equally and not just the rich. Primakov viewed these as 
problems that needed to be addressed by the state since the private sector is not, for example, going 
to do anything to keep remote economically important regions populated.241 
 
As touched upon before, Primakov was always keen on fighting corruption and organized crime, both 
of which he believed surfaced during the chaotic years of the 1990s. He supported strong state 
opposition to the oligarchs and their power within both the economic and political spheres. To show 
his distaste for the system that developed in the 1990s Primakov called it “oligarchic capitalism”242.  
 
Primakov was careful to not glorify the Soviet past, but he clearly found many of its aspects appealing, 
especially after having witnessed the wild, early years of the Russian Federation. When asked about 
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the selection and promotion of administrative staff in Russia, he said that the current system could be 
improved. 
You want to compare all that with the Soviet period. It seems to me that the party system of 
that period, regardless of all its minuses, also had some pluses. Through the Komsomol and 
the Party, strong leaders of the economy and the strongest managers won promotion. 
Promotion was less likely to be based on cronyism. 
 
He then brought up a few problems that made selection processes often unfair such as information 
used against job candidates that they themselves were not aware of243.  
 
Primakov also did not shy away from harsh measures to bring about stability and order, which he 
valued quite highly. In his book A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 
his discussion on the situation in Chechnya reveals something about his thoughts regarding control 
and stability. He would have liked to see someone from the Federal Executive branch managing 
everything: reconstruction, military operations and assistance to the local government. This person 
should have had authority over the Ministry of Defense, Internal Affairs and FSS offices and made 
sure that the President’s orders were properly executed in Chechnya. He explained, “having all 
authority in the hands of one individual with direct access to President Putin would avoid inconsistent 
action, tighten discipline, and increase the accountability for everyone involved in Chechnya.”244 
Primakov thought the role of the government should be increased leading him to suggest measures, 
such as depicted above, and which are in line with him being a Statist. 
 
Primakov was aware of the challenges with more state control and commented about navigating 
between dictatorship and chaos based on his own experiences.  
When I became prime minister and for some time afterward, the most important task was to 
find a path between dictatorship and chaos. I think we found it by strengthening the role of 
the state and increasing its effectiveness. For a market economy and society in general the 
danger lies not in a strong state that relies on the law and democratic processes, but in a weak 
government that, even with the best intentions, tries to interfere in private life and in the 
workings of the society and becomes a tool of influential groups. As FDR used to say: ‘A 
strong, active state will never degenerate into a dictatorship. Dictatorship always replaces a 
weak and helpless government.’”245 
 
It is clear that Primakov was not especially nostalgic for the Soviet times nor a strong proponent for 
dictatorship. He often talked about the virtues of Russia’s newly found democracy and freedom, but 
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his desire for both stability and order are important when constructing his operational code and should 
not be overlooked246,247,248. However, one does find it difficult to pursue maximum freedom while 
insisting on tight discipline, order and stability. It should be remembered that the Russian Federation 
found itself in a very chaotic state after the collapse of the Soviet Union and because of that, this 
balancing act between order and freedom was indeed a very tricky one. Having gotten a taste for 
Primakov’s views on control and one’s role in shaping history and developments on the domestic 
level, we can move on to discuss his views on the same topic, but at the macro level. Having started 
with the domestic before moving to the international is important because his views of the issue on 
one level directly translate to the other.  
 
6.1.4. Moving on to the Macro Level 
Yevgeny Primakov believed that the world is governed by certain constants that bind political action, 
but within that framework a person can set goals and achieve them, for example, through diplomacy 
and collective action. And, since he was an experienced diplomat, it is interesting to examine what 
kinds of tactics he used to construct a narrative that would help Russia advance national interests in 
the international arena. Put in other words, how he wanted to shape history in a desired direction.  
 
Promoting multipolarity is one tactic utilized by Primakov to move history in the desired direction. 
This goes hand-in-hand with his calls for a more significant role for the UN and attempts to create a 
new world order opposed to the US-led hegemonic world order. This American system according to 
Primakov, is opposed by virtually everyone249. Regardless of Primakov’s arguments that the United 
States is not a global hegemon, he was fighting windmills about it. He denied that the United States 
is a superpower, while at the same time opposed their hegemonic world order. It cannot be both. This 
is one of the examples where it is hard to say whether he knew of the contradiction and tried to make 
the argument anyway, or if he truly believed in his narrative. The United States has clearly not yet 
shown significant signs of absolute decline from its dominant position in the 1990s250. While it is true 
that the American-made world order is opposed by some countries, saying that most countries prefer 
something else is a stretch. Primakov did not shy away from making two additional arguments: that 
a multipolar world would be in the interest of virtually everyone, including the United States, and 
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that a unipolar system would be even less stable and more prone to conflict than a bipolar system as 
existed during the Cold War251. 
 
Primakov thought that a conflict would be sparked by countries that attempt to oppose the US 
dominated system by attempting to level the playing field and make the world a more equal place 
with multiple power centers252. Whether Russia should be counted among one of these potential 
conflict countries is not completely clear, but hints of this can be found between the lines of 
Primakov’s texts. Yevgeny Primakov wanted to see the United States give up its status for the 
common good, but if it did not, Russia would do what is necessary to claim a seat at the table anyway. 
This is clearly part of his strategy; to argue that Russia is only for stability, the US for instability. 
And, in order to fix this, Russia is in practice willing to engage in a conflict in the name of rebalancing. 
A conflict for which the US would be the only party to blame according to his narrative.253 This is 
typical Primakov. If hard decisions or actions must be undertaken by Russia, an argument must be 
constructed according to which Russia is still supporting peace and the common good. It is possible 
that he has learned some tricks from working for Pravda, including how to control the narrative to 
benefit yourself while holding on to certain facts and constants, but rejecting others. 
 
6.1.5. Practical Examples of Controlling Historical Developments 
Without a doubt Primakov had a realistic view of the world, but he tends to explain whatever he can 
from a point of superiority. Shortly after he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs he said,  
despite the current difficulties, Russia has been and remains a great power, and its policy 
toward the outside world should correspond to that status... In advocating partnership relations 
with our former cold war adversaries, we proceed from the need for an equitable – and I want 
to put special emphasis here on this- equitable and mutually advantageous partnership that 
takes each other’s interests into account.254 
 
He also wanted to highlight the fact that he thought Russia did not lose the Cold War, but that 
everyone came out of it as winners, having saved themselves from the policy of confrontation255, 256.  
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It is also worth mentioning again Primakov’s claim that when the bipolar world came to an end (in 
other words, the Soviet Union fell), both the former USSR and the United States lost their position 
as a superpower257. Similarly, he makes the case that when the Soviet Union lost their grip of their 
satellites, the United States also lost some control of their protectorates who in turn no longer 
depended on the United States’ nuclear umbrella258. Russia had reformed their economy and became 
democratic which benefited the whole world259. They had renewed themselves, ridding themselves 
of their past sins, while the United States was still stuck in backwards Cold War era thinking. 
Interestingly, this type of reasoning was already used by Primakov in a Pravda article in 1987260. This 
way of presenting these issues is beneficial for Russia, because they help put in context Russia’s 
economic problems and present them as the morally superior party. When constructing this narrative, 
Primakov was able to mix and match: do away with the obvious issues that would logically stand in 
the way of demanding a more significant portion of the pie while playing the victim card which earns 
pity points.  
 
In the preface to his book Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium, Primakov described the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and how horrific they were. He then continued to discuss the developmental gap 
between the wealthy West and the rest of the world due to globalization which can be linked to the 
rise of terrorism. (This is perhaps a subtle way of saying that this particular issue is not caused by 
Russia, but that Russia will certainly help to fix the problem). Once this point is made, he argued that 
countries should not solely focus on their own and their allies’ security nor on establishing regional 
and global stability. Instead, the main focus should be put on fighting terrorism.261 And in order to do 
so, Primakov made the case that  
it is imperative that the world’s constructive forces unite. The struggle against terrorism will 
be ineffective without Russia’s participation. A strong Russia, that is. A weak country torn 
apart by internal conflicts and in possession of a huge nuclear arsenal is unstable and 
unpredictable. Such a Russia threatens the interests not only of its own people but of the rest 
of the world. A strong Russia should not be seen as a threat to world stability. The idea that 
Russia represents a threat can result only from inertia, from survival of the Cold War 
mentality, and from underestimation of the changes that have taken place in Russia and are 
taking place now. Russia must be seen as it actually is if the international community is to 
seize every opportunity to resolve the issues common to all of us in our turbulent world.262 
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It is no accident that this particular book was published in the United States. Primakov explained in 
the preface to the book that his intention was to expound Russian political and social life which he 
had experienced first-hand.263 
 
His book’s preface, which has been quoted in part above, illustrates something very telling about 
Primakov which repeats itself throughout his texts, but is here in a very compact and holistic manner. 
He liked to discuss important and concerning matters with the occasional blaming finger pointed 
towards the United States, albeit here less so, than in other contexts. The main point is always that 
there are many issues that must be dealt with, but that cannot be solved without the help of Russia. 
Russia is both a new, and at the same time still an important, player that has been ignored for a long 
time. But, now for the sake of the common good, peace and stability, Russia “must be seen as it 
actually is.”264 It is interesting that, to repeat parts of the above quoted text, he also mentions Russia 
having to be “strong” while hinting that “a weak country torn apart by internal conflicts and in 
possession of a huge nuclear arsenal is unstable and unpredictable”.265 This, as already touched upon, 
seems to be one of Primakov’s strategies for moving and shaping history in the desired direction and 
how he brought his narrative to its conclusion. Step one: rise concerns for the whole world’s well-
being and make the case that Russia must be allowed to rise to its past glory to make things better 
again. Then, step two, issue a veiled threat: or else everyone will suffer as a result.  
 
In summary, Yevgeny Primakov believed in the significance and ability of individuals and countries 
to influence historical developments. As a Statist, he believed in a big government that should guide 
and control developments domestically, which translated into similar views on the international level.   
Even though he often spoke about historical continuity, he still did not think the world could be left 
to take shape on its own.  The UN was an entity that in his mind should be given a bigger role in 
international relations. He also wanted to move the world order away from American dominance 
towards multipolarity where Russia would be seen as a major player. Primakov believed in Russia’s 
right to occupy such a position and constructed narratives to support this claim.  
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5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development? 
 
When reading Yevgeny Primakov’s texts, one gets a sense that he did not believe chance to dictate 
historical development in any major way. He believed in shaping events based on one’s own interest 
and in historical trends. For example, as Russia develops its institutions and democracy it will happen 
in a Russian way, taking their own interests into account266. For Primakov, surprises seemed to be 
anomalies but when they happened they too would have organically grown from previous 
developments and would soon be woven into the pre-existing fabric of history. For example, 
Primakov said in an interview in 2006 that  
Europe is becoming increasingly integrated. Twenty years ago, none of us anticipated the 
euro. We thought that the talk of an integrated European currency was just that—talk. Now it 
has become a reality. I think that integration will continue, but it will not change the national 
character of the European states. After all, the French will not start referring to themselves as 
German-French, nor will the Germans start calling themselves Franco-Germans.267 
 
Primakov thought that, usually, events do not simply happen; they are made to happen. Controlling 
political events is crucial and as he said, “the role of the individual in history is great.”268 Given this, 
carefully conducting diplomacy is essential and a skilled professional can do a lot to move things in 
the desired direction. In his accounts of past diplomatic developments, he always mapped out reasons 
for why things went a certain way and what it would have taken for them to have turned out 
differently. For example, Primakov believed that Russia deserved the status of a great power, but to 
maintain that required careful planning and maneuvering. If Russia was to let go of their position, 
someone else would take over. This was to be avoided by preventive action. One is to either take a 
backseat and let events take shape on their own, or alternatively participate in shaping one’s 
surroundings towards favorable outcomes. His detailed accounts show his long-term thinking and 
commitment to the rigorous work required to get things done the right way.269 Sometimes failures are 
inevitable, but they can always be explained by differing interest or other similar reasoning and for 
Primakov chance was rarely one of them.270 
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6.2. Instrumental Questions 
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? 
 
Primakov was careful to not provoke an unnecessary conflict by ignoring common international 
interests. He implied that Russian interests must come first, and political goals must start with a 
careful consideration of one’s own interest. “We should try to find solutions that will neither sacrifice 
Russia’s vital national interests nor lead to confrontation.”271 Primakov preferred to frame Russia’s 
pursuit of interests in a way that they could be argued to fall in line with the interests of others, making 
them seem like “the right thing to do.” In short, all political goals must be viewed as stepping stones 
for enhancing Russian interests and restoration.  
 
This way Russia could be portrayed as a country that pursues the common good, such as stability and 
peace among nations while formulating a narrative differentiating Russia from the United States as 
the morally superior country. Primakov used this type of rhetoric when describing the late years of 
the Soviet Union. He compared the intentions of the former Soviet Union as wanting to cool down 
the arms race to some elements in the West who just focused on breaking down the USSR by 
accelerating the race and causing instability272. This way of framing issues gives Russia much more 
leeway to go for their own interests. The policy of supporting a multipolar world system is a good 
example of this. 
 
Some have argued that Russia should first concentrate on domestic reforms and development and 
only then engage in an active foreign policy, claiming a status as a major player in international 
politics. For Primakov, this approach leads nowhere. He preferred a different one, where foreign 
policy was understood in a remarkably wide context.  
Without an active foreign policy it would be difficult or impossible for Russia to carry out 
radical reforms domestically, preserve its territorial integrity and security, and become 
integrated with the world economy as a full and equal participant.273  
 
Elsewhere, Primakov argued for a multidirectional policy, which reached out to a variety of countries 
instead of just a few that were considered the most important ones. He also implied, that Russia must 
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pick their friends based on what benefits Russia’s interests, and not subject themselves to unequal 
partnerships at any cost, just because the other party happens to be a major player. 274 
 
When Primakov talked about reclaiming Russia’s status as a major player in the international arena, 
it implied it was a necessity to consider which objectives would be best to help increase Russia’s 
prestige and influence. It could be said that Primakov took a practical approach regarding his best 
practices for selecting goals and objectives for political action. Much of it had to do with selecting 
and creating the best possible narrative for a given situation, a subject that keeps coming up frequently 
when formulating his operational code. In 1998 Primakov declared that “there are no constant 
enemies but there are constant national interests.”275 He advocated for a flexible approach for 
reaching Russian interests leaving no room for ideology, which according to him, often got in the 
way of rational pragmatism in the Soviet Union276. This could be interpreted as implying that for 
Primakov, even his cherished concept of multipolarity might not have been an end in itself, but rather 
a well-calculated means for getting to an even more important end: Russia becoming a legitimate 
great power again. In short, Primakov selected goals based on Russia’s interests. They were often 
realistic, but sometimes required some narrative creation in order to sell them to a wider international 
audience.  
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2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 
 
Perhaps the most important lesson to learn from Yevgeny Primakov regarding the methods for 
pursuing his political goals is what could be called the “fake it until you make it” principle. Meaning, 
behave in such a way as if Russia had already reached the position of a major player in world politics. 
Put another way, Primakov seemed to want Russia to appear stronger than it is, in order to reach a 
better negotiating position. It could also be argued that constructing a preferable narrative about one’s 
own position versus others’ is part of pursuing political goals for Primakov, especially when it 
pertains to attaining the legitimacy of being a major power. Lastly, Primakov attempted to reinvent 
the rules and conditions of the international arena to make it fairer for Russia.  
 
How then can legitimacy and the status of a major power be achieved most effectively? The best 
examples come from Primakov’s own texts. One way is to hold on to high morals, appearing more 
virtuous than one’s opponents. Already in 1987 Primakov made the claim, that since its birth, the 
USSR had been “struggling for peace among peoples,” and that “peace remains the main goal of the 
USSR’s foreign policy.”277 In the same Pravda article Primakov discussed new, more peaceful 
proposals for Soviet foreign policy such as not viewing regional tensions though the United States-
USSR rivalry and focusing on avoiding a nuclear Armageddon. According to Primakov, the Soviet 
Union was willing to pursue a new line of policy but made it clear that he did not believe the United 
States was ready to follow suite, quite the contrary. He highlighted the difference between the two 
rivals to make the argument that the USSR was for peace and the United States was not. 
Of course, the situation is still a long way from one in which these new approaches and the 
new political thinking are adopted by the American leadership. More than that, the US is 
putting up a fierce resistance to the Soviet course. Militarism doesn’t surrender so easily, and 
it isn’t going to surrender its positions.278  
 
In fact, he thought that public opinion in the West was becoming more and more favorable towards 
the Soviet Union. “It is becoming more and more difficult for the anti-Sovieteers in the West to 
maintain their artificially created image of the USSR as a bellicose undemocratic state that threatens 
the world and thinks about nothing but expansion.”279 
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Primakov used almost identical language about the situation in the Middle East in 1984 in his article 
USA: Policy of Destabilization in the Middle East. He compared American and Soviet policies in the 
area: the United States was militaristic, exploiting the area and manipulated the Arab countries into 
thinking that the Soviet Union is a threat to them, when in reality it was United States-backed Israel. 
The Soviet Union was presented as a benign friend of the Middle East with only realistic and 
common-sense solutions to the hot situation.280 In a familiar tone Primakov wrote,  
two lines have clashed in the Middle East: one is the consistent line of the Soviet Union 
directed at a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the interest of all the peoples 
populating the region. The other is the US line directed at ensuring an opportunity for Israel 
to retain the Arab territories seized in 1967 with a simultaneous strengthening of American 
position in the Arab world.  
 
He concluded the article with a warning. The destructive United States’ policy was potentially going 
to not only hurt the region but could also “jeopardize universal peace.”281 These examples of course 
were written back in the Soviet period, but Primakov’s more recent statements did not significantly 
differ from the arguments presented here although his arguments later were a bit more polished and 
diplomatic.  
 
Another narrative that Primakov liked to repeat made Russia stand apart from the more aggressive 
and stuck-in-the-Cold-War-era West, was to argue that Russia is no longer a threat (or like in the 
previous article mentioned, that the Soviet Union could not possibly be a threat to the region).282 This 
allowed him to argue that those who suggest there was any reason to still regard Russia as such were 
backwards and militaristic. As early as 1993 Primakov criticized NATO for not having transformed 
its role in the new “post confrontational period.”283 
Another reality was the fixed nature of stereotypes of bloc thinking, which is especially 
characteristic of a number of representatives of the military leadership in the Western 
countries and in the alliance as a whole. One of these stereotypes is associated with the fact 
that the USSR, the nucleus of which was Russia, was regarded for many years as the main 
source of military danger to the very existence of Western civilization.284 
 
 He added that trying to break this “psychological mindset” is hard due to, for example, resistance 
from the military-industrial complex and certain leaders. Also, during the arms race it was vital to 
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maintain a certain image of the enemy for the sake of the public. According to him, these were facts 
that may explain why Russia is still viewed though the dated Cold War prism285. This narrative 
creation is interesting, because it automatically makes the scholar wonder whether Primakov was 
completely serious about his suggestions, or if it is all just a calculated game. One could assume that 
back in 1993 it would have been too early to expect Western countries to think Russia would be 
completely different from the Soviet Union.  
 
How then does Primakov attempt to make Russia look stronger and more relevant than it actually 
was? As has already been suggested, Primakov believed diplomacy, collective action, and appealing 
to shared and universal interests to be good ways to effectively pursue one’s goals in the new post-
Cold War era. One way to get there is to paint Russia as a new alternative; a new mature big brother 
in world politics. Primakov of course did not use such language, but his texts could be interpreted to 
at least hint towards such an alternative. In his writings and statements, Russia was often presented 
as the more virtuous of the old Cold War rivals. And, that the United States has been unjustly angling 
for a dominating position in world politics. Primakov made sure to criticize their actions drawing 
direct comparisons to them and Russia of which we have already seen some examples. A look at 
some more recent articulations is revealing.  
 
Primakov criticized the United States for invading Iraq when it was a secular state and for turning it 
into a divided, Islamic country with a significant Al-Qaeda presence. They did so unilaterally, in 
defiance of common sense and with an arrogant assumption that they could just export 
democracy286,287. Furthermore, the United States exercised aggressive policies in the Soviet ex-
satellite countries antagonizing Russia and jealously resisted Russia’s emergence as a main stabilizing 
force in the world288. The idea behind these comparisons is clear: the United States is an immature, 
aggressive bully that only cares about itself, whereas Russia is the opposite.  
 
Through this lens, whereas the United States is angling for unilateralism and dominance, Russia is 
striving for multipolarity and collective action by assuming “the role of a counterbalance to the 
negative trends” in current world politics289,290. Russia is a peaceful and a better alternative whose 
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national interests of security, stability and peace happen to be the same as the interests of the whole 
world291. Furthermore, Russia’s democratic transformation is important for the rest of the world too, 
but it cannot be achieved without an active foreign policy292. Primakov made it clear that issues of 
security, stability and peace cannot be effectively solved without Russia293. It might be argued that 
by doing this Primakov was trying to create a narrative according to which the Russian position was 
described as true and legitimate.  
 
According to Primakov, issues such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts 
still persisted after the end of the Cold War294. These issues called for a multilateral response and 
when it comes to terrorism, for example, Primakov was able to make a strong claim.  
The struggle against terrorism will be ineffective without Russia’s participation. A strong 
Russia, that is. A weak country torn apart by internal conflicts and in possession of a huge 
nuclear arsenal is unstable and unpredictable. Such a Russia threatens the interests not only 
of its own people but of the rest of the world. A strong Russia should not be seen as a threat 
to world stability. The idea that Russia represents a threat can result only from inertia, from 
survival of the Cold War mentality, and from underestimation of the changes that have taken 
place in Russia and are taking place now. Russia must be seen as it actually is if the 
international community is to seize every opportunity to resolve the issues common to all of 
us in our turbulent world.295 
 
Similarly, Primakov tried to recreate the existing rules of international behavior to better fit Russian 
purposes when he criticized NATO. In an article The World On the Eve of the 21st Century Primakov 
called for a new collective security structure for Europe, but issued a warning: “again, such 
architecture will collapse if in Europe new dividing lines appear or if in the basis of the model of 
security not such a universal organization as the OSCE, but say, NATO, is included, even if it has 
been linked with Russia though ‘special relations.’”296 In the same article Primakov laid out 
“conditions for the transition to a new world order.” Most of these conditions essentially are designed 
to make the world more accessible and fairer for Russia 297.  
 
He also came up with somewhat artificial rules that allowed Russia enough wiggle room to protect 
their interests in ways they saw fit. For example, in the article quoted above, he engaged in a lengthy 
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discussion of collective security and the UN being the only organization that is allowed to use force 
and levy sanctions298. But he then also says “collective security, of course, to no degree denies the 
sovereign right of any state in the system to use independent efforts to protect its own security.”299 
This interesting double standard will be discussed in more detail later in the analysis section. In the 
context of achieving goals, Primakov shows a willingness to make exceptions. 
 
Primakov did not believe in meritocracy when it came to international status, but that Russia by virtue 
of its history belonged to the “aristocracy” of great powers entitling them to demand and receive 
respect from others. In summary, Primakov believed the best way to achieve goals was a combination 
of pretending to be what one desires to be, creating morally superior narratives and, when necessary, 
making exceptions to rules. 
 
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
 
Yevgeny Primakov was more willing to take political risks than it may first appear when reading his 
texts or speeches. Themes repeatedly found in his texts are the importance of not letting events spiral 
out of control and trying not to cause a conflict even when protecting one’s interests300. However, 
these rules are subject to the belief that Russian interests cannot be tread on and advancing them does 
pose a risk of confrontation. What exactly that means and how far Primakov would personally have 
gone protecting these interests is not completely clear from his very diplomatic language.301 One 
might wonder though, whether his calls for respect for others’ interest and flexibility were directed 
more at the outside world and their actions towards Russia than toward Russian behavior itself. If this 
reasoning is accepted then it could be speculated that Primakov would have been quite willing to 
practice brinkmanship in pursuit of Russian interests, especially if he felt that others had infringed on 
them.  
 
In 1996 Primakov argued,  
today Russia has perhaps a greater interest than ever before in protecting its national interests. 
But the dialectics of politics consist in that the protection of these interests must not lead to a 
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slide toward confrontation. Russia will do everything in its power to prevent such a slide and 
to see to it that its interests are protected in a civilized manner.302 
 
Then he adds, “However, NATO’s plans for expansion are creating a situation that is dramatically 
worse for us in every respect – politically, psychologically, militarily and geopolitically.” He ends in 
a plea, “since every country has its own national interests, allow Russia to have such interests, too, 
and allow it to protect those interests if it believes they are threatened by the prospect of NATO 
expansion.”303 What kind of risks Primakov was willing to take in order to protect these interests 
remains a mystery.  
 
Conflict prevention seemed to be a theme that Primakov liked to return to frequently. When Primakov 
became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was asked about objective difficulties waiting for him. He 
answered, “Preventing the struggle for Russia’s interests from growing into a confrontation with those 
we won’t allow to violate those interests.” He continued to explain, that a great power is expected to 
be involved in all areas of world politics, but that not everyone likes the idea. “It will not be easy to 
get universal Russian involvement accepted without conflict.”304 It is hard to unpack these statements 
to tell what exactly they entail. Perhaps a warning that Russia is willing to take risks if certain 
conditions are met. Perhaps, based on the quote in the next paragraph, it could be argued that 
Primakov places much responsibility in the hands of other states, especially the United States. He 
also could be viewed as setting ultimatums which if broken would free Russia from all restraint.  
 
In his book The World Challenged Primakov recalls the end of the Cold War when Russia was at its 
weakest. The United States took advantage of the situation and instead of formulating common 
policies, they only gave Russia a supporting role in the back seat. It was as if Russia had to apply for 
a membership at a club headed by the United States. Describing the situation Primakov wrote the 
following.  
It is not appropriate for Russia to be relegated to playing a supporting role in world events. 
This leads, then, to a question: if Russia is unwilling to play a subordinate role to the United 
States, will this result in continuing tension between Russia and the United States? I think 
not—but only if Washington fully grasps how futile and counterproductive it is to try to turn 
Russia into a vassal subservient to U.S. policy and will. I dare say not one Russian leader 
would last long in power if he took this approach… I believe that all this is dependent, to a 
considerable extent on U.S. policies.305 
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Taken at face value, the above statement implies Primakov would have taken significant risks in order 
to achieve his goal of a Russia in its rightful place.  
 
Diplomatically too Primakov was willing to take risks when he felt Russia’s pride demanded it. Once 
Primakov was on a plane heading to the United States to discuss economic issues. The meeting was 
planned well in advance and was to include a session with the American President. However, while 
over the Atlantic, Al Gore and Primakov had a phone conversation during which Primakov learned 
of airstrikes on Yugoslavia which Russia did not approve of. Primakov then made a decision to turn 
the plane around over the ocean to make it seem like Russia would not in any way support this 
decision.306 This u-turn was later dubbed “the Primakov loop”.307 
 
Based on this, one must conclude that contrary to what Primakov said about his distaste for conflict 
and resorting to it only after exhausting all political means possible, he was actually at least in some 
cases willing to support its use if Russia’s status or interests were threatened. He seemed willing to 
take risks and push other’s limits if one could give the impression that Russia is acting defensively 
and fighting a clear injustice. 
  
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests? 
 
Primakov clearly argued that the best timing for his active foreign policy, and by implication for 
advancing Russia’s vital interests, was here and now.308 However, taking advantage of favorable 
circumstances was useful and should be pursued within the context of active advancement of 
interests. There is some evidence in Primakov’s statements and texts that suggest he believed a good 
time to advance one’s interests was when the United States had first made a move that was potentially 
received negatively around the world. Or, when any other situation arose where Russia could look 
better compared to the United States. This gave Russia a good chance to advance their interests with 
greater ease. An added benefit was that merely being able to compare oneself to the alleged 
“hegemon” positively fulfilled an interest in itself. For example, when the United States was acting 
unilaterally in the Middle East, Primakov preferred to highlight Russia’s desire to move towards 
collective action and multipolarity309.   
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Sometimes it might be in Russia’s interest to try to block American plans when Russia cannot quite 
keep up by framing American interests as sources of instability and division. Primakov discussed 
American plans to develop a space-based antimissile defense system and linked it to another 
important matter: fighting terrorism. He argued that it not only did not help counter-terrorism efforts 
but made them more difficult by dividing nations and “setting their interests at odds.” He then 
described a scenario in which, if the United States would succeed in building such a system, more 
aggressive elements in the country would likely be encouraged to act even more unilaterally and 
cause an arms race that would render everyone more insecure.310 
 
In conclusion, Primakov did not think Russia had time to grow stronger before assuming the role of 
a major power and to act on interests that came with that status. He often compared Russia to the 
United States. From this interplay, he timed justification for advancing Russia’s interests with when 
current events where most favorable. These fortuitous situations could arise from the American side 
or alternatively be put into motion first by Russia.  
 
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? 
 
Primakov preferred to attempt to establish the moral high ground using conciliatory language and 
multilateralism while at the same time engaging in veiled, ambiguous threats to ensure others 
understood he was serious. Primakov of course did not overtly advocate for such a dualistic way of 
advancing one’s interests, but he himself was often found using it. It is a good tactic since so much 
focus was put on peaceful and cooperative aspects of actions, making possible threats sound less 
aggressive. When this type of rhetoric is directed at the United States it gives the impression that 
should Primakov’s Russia act forcefully, they would do it reluctantly and only because they had no 
other options. Additionally, Primakov’s rhetoric made it impossible to predict exactly when he would 
like Russia to use force and how that would look like in practice, but perhaps that had utility on its 
own. 
 
Primakov also engaged in narrative creation. He not only painted a positive picture of Russia as a 
peace-loving country, but also explained one’s own position in such a way that certain interests 
simply naturally flowed from it. This allowed Primakov to criticize American unilateralism, while 
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elsewhere making the argument that Russia would of course be the main player in the CIS because 
of historical patterns311. Similarly, Primakov painted a picture of Russia as a responsible big brother 
who knew what the best course of action was from everybody’s point of view. For example, he talked 
about developing the CIS for their own good.312 And additionally, how a multilateral world would in 
fact be in the best interest of the United States (even though Primakov thought they were actively 
trying to stop its development)313. 
 
Primakov’s narratives also touched upon certain common, negative associations placed on Russia by 
other countries. They were explained away with examples of Russia’s interest in peace, while pushing 
any negative alternative narratives under the carpet as mere misunderstandings. For example, he said 
that 
Russia’s desire to play an active role in the global community should not be misinterpreted. 
Russia’s desire to keep its status as a great world power has absolutely nothing to do with 
aspirations for empire building, a motive that is occasionally attributed to us. Rather, this 
desire stems from our knowledge that Russian foreign policy can do much to help stabilize 
conflict situations in regions around the world. Russia is certainly as interested in this as any 
other nation of the world, perhaps more so.314 
 
This comparison can be viewed as a useful means of making Russia look better; helping them advance 
their interests. As mentioned previously, Primakov often compared Russia to the United States, 
especially to make the case that Russia was superior in many ways. This is done by picking 
unfavorable aspects about the other side and presenting them vis-á-vis something positive in relation 
to Russia315. 
 
Perhaps the most important way to advance one’s interests was Primakov’s “fake it till you make it” 
approach. Once the Soviet Union fell and the Russian Federation came to replace it, Primakov did 
not accept defeat. He wanted Russia to continue acting as a major player though, given the 
circumstances, it was not a status they truly deserved or could defend. He did not accept Russia being 
sidelined in international politics even when the country was going through a fundamental 
reorganization and major economic, social and political struggles. This is because he held the view 
that Russia is a major player by nature, no matter the circumstances. Lastly, he did not think that 
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Russia should wait for their economy to recover in order to engage in an active foreign policy316. This 
attitude required a well thought out approach to international relations that has been described in 
detail above.  
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7. ANALYSIS 
7.1. A Westernizing Leader or a Hard-Liner?  
Yevgeny Primakov has been a controversial figure among Western analysts for the past twenty years. 
Interpretations of his policies and intentions have varied from him being a westernizing leader to a 
hard-liner who was no stranger to conflict. For example, Jeffrey Surovell complained in 2005 that 
Primakov had been misinterpreted as a leftist hard-liner who was also anti-West. According to his 
interpretation, Primakov had more right-wing tendencies because he supported many of President 
Putin’s policies that have widely been viewed as authoritarian or even fascist. However, Surovell also 
argues that Primakov only came across as a hard-liner in his texts and speeches when in practice he 
did not even oppose NATO expansion. Nor was he anti-West in other ways.317 Surovell brings up an 
often-heard explanation that Russian leaders have submitted to many Western policies such as NATO 
expansion, because Russia has been too weak to put up a fight. Using dependency theory, Surovell 
shows that Russia has in fact been dependent on the West and argues that is because Russia’s 
westernizing leaders, such as Yevgeny Primakov, brought Russia into that situation to begin with. 
Therefore, actual resistance and anti-Westernism could not take place.318  
 
In 1997, Ariel Cohen argued for a very different view of Primakov. He depicted a man who’s 
“Primakov Doctrine” was an attempt to create a partnership between Russia, China and Iran to 
counterbalance and challenge American power, and who was threatening to “turn Russia’s relations 
with the United States into a zero-sum game”319 and who threatened world peace. Cohen saw this 
policy as dating back to the Cold War and Primakov himself as a “quintessential Soviet establishment 
insider” who was trained by the KGB as an Oriental scholar. He is also depicted as a supporter of 
Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, Muammar Qaddafi and Yasser Arafat. Cohen did not then believe 
Russia to be strong enough to truly challenge the United States but saw Primakov’s attempts as 
dangerous and hindering Russia’s integration with the West.320 He sums up Primakov’s “neo-Soviet 
foreign policy” as “one of nurturing geopolitical tensions, imperial grudges, and as-yet-unfulfilled 
great power ambitions.”321  
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The difference in interpretations between these two men’s analysis on Yevgeny Primakov is striking. 
Based on the research conducted above for Primakov’s operational code, neither one of these views 
is correct. Additionally, the views expressed in these two articles are overly simplistic. Primakov was 
a complex figure who held important government positions during difficult times in Russian history. 
His views cannot be analyzed based solely on his statements nor solely on his actions. We must also 
be careful to not study Russian leaders, or others for that matter, from a black and white perspective 
or as “good” or “bad” from a Western point of view.  
 
Jeffrey Surovell observed Primakov’s pragmatism and positioning in an impossible situation after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union when he was forced to “allow” NATO expansion and submit to other 
Western policies. He argued that Primakov was a westernizing leader who himself guided Russia into 
this very situation. This is a mistake. The fact that Primakov supported the new Russian Federation, 
democratization and other reforms may make him appear pro-West at first glance, but it did not make 
him a westernizer like Andrei Kozyrev. He was a reformer who no doubt saw an opportunity to 
change much of the system and who did not desire to return to the Soviet times. Yet, we must analyze 
his intentions within his own, Russian context and avoid interpreting them from our own, Western 
point of view. For example, when discussing democracy, which he strongly supported in his texts, he 
formulated it like this, “when moving toward the universal human values and democracy Russia is 
following its own road determined by its traditions, the past, its multinational nature, and 
geography.”322 Here and in many other contexts, Primakov wanted to do things the Russian way, not 
follow in the footsteps of any particular country or ideology. It can be argued that Primakov and other 
Russian leaders could not have played their cards much differently in the late 1990s if the scholar is 
to take a pragmatic stance on their policies. The fact that they “allowed” certain Western policies to 
pass without a confrontation does not mean that they in any way were comfortable with the situation. 
Understanding how Primakov, as a Statist, felt during these times is key to understanding later 
Russian actions and policies when the country found itself in an improved situation politically and 
economically.  
 
Ariel Cohen was also wrong in his analysis on Primakov by seeing all of his views and policies aimed 
threateningly toward the United States. Cohen also failed to see the end of the Cold War from Russia’s 
point of view. He instead viewed everything as a continuation of Soviet policies in a different 
wrapping. Primakov’s attempts to undermine American influence and his support for a multipolar 
world should not be viewed as directed against the United States the same way Soviet policies often 
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were. From this point of view Russia did have a legitimate need to diversify their relations with the 
rest of the world’s power centers to counterbalance the hegemonic system that had emerged after the 
Cold War which undoubtedly put Russia in an extremely unfavorable situation. Primakov does not 
appear to have had an innate need to deliberately put Russia at odds with the United States unless the 
United States had first pushed for it. Understanding Primakov’s motivation behind his idea for 
multipolarity is very important and more complex than it might appear at first glance. He wanted to 
do what was best for Russia as a major power and execute this policy in a Russian way without strong 
ideological pulls from any side.  
 
The purpose of this thesis was to partly investigate, what this “Russian way” meant for Primakov and 
how he viewed the world. Primakov operated from a Statist point of view, a foreign policy school of 
thought still often followed by President Putin. Kuchins and Zevelev call Statists “Great Power 
Balancers” and point at Primakov as the founder of this school of thought which falls between the 
extreme schools of “Pro-Western liberals” and “Nationalists”323. In Tsygankov’s classifications, 
these groups are Westernizers, Statists and Civilizationists. Perhaps in the West there is a tendency 
to either group Russian politicians in one or the other of the more extreme groups. However, most of 
the recent policies in the country have been in line with the middle group, the Statists. Yevgeny 
Primakov should not be viewed as a threatening hard-liner, nor as a Westernizer. He is something in 
between. 
 
7.2. Key Elements in Primakov’s Operational Code 
7.2.1. Operational Code Summary Table  
 
Key Elements from the Philosophical Questions 
1. What is the "essential" nature of 
political life? Is the political 
universe one of harmony or 
conflict? What is the fundamental 
character of one's political 
opponents? 
For Primakov, opponents are those who selfishly and 
arrogantly try to force their own will on his preferred system 
of governance and world order against the interests of all. 
This included Russian oligarchs and the United States when 
acting unilaterally. The world according to Primakov had the 
potential to become more harmonious if a multipolar system 
was to develop. However, due to the United States’ 
opposition to this better world order and old persisting threats 
that were hard to control in a unipolar world, such as 
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terrorism, regional conflicts and weapons of mass destruction, 
the world is more chaotic than it has to be. 
2. What are the prospects for the 
eventual realization of one's 
fundamental political values and 
aspirations? Can one be optimistic, 
or must one be pessimistic on this 
score, and in what respects the one 
and/or the other? 
One of Primakov’s most fundamental aspirations was the 
formation of a multipolar world. He thought that it would be 
possible, but that the United States was the factor that would 
either block it or help it come about. However, during the first 
decade of the 20th century the United States showed no 
interest in creating a multipolar world. Also, Primakov 
wanted to see Russia restore their great power status to which 
multipolarity was a means. This was a hope which was also 
often frustrated by the United States by not treating them as 
an equal player.  
3. Is the political future 
predictable? In what sense and to 
what extent? 
Primakov holds on to two different sets of beliefs at the same 
time: the importance of historical continuity and trying to 
guide developments in the desired direction. Usually the road 
that leads to the most efficient fulfilment of Russia’s goals is 
the one chosen. 
4. How much "control" or 
"mastery" can one have over 
historical development? What is 
one's role in "moving" and 
"shaping" history in the desired 
direction? 
Individuals and countries can shape historical developments 
according to Primakov. Domestically the government should 
occupy a major role and internationally a group of major 
countries with the United Nations should assume the same 
job. Russia should be one of these influential states. Primakov 
personally pushed for a strong government at home and a 
bigger role for Russia internationally.  
5. What is the role of "chance" in 
human affairs and in historical 
development? 
Primakov did not believe chance had a major role in historical 
development. Events are either rooted in historical trends or 
are made to happen. 
Key Elements from the Instrumental Questions 
1. What is the best approach for 
selecting goals or objectives for 
political action? 
 
It is important to try to navigate between causing a conflict 
and effectively advancing Russia’s interests. Also framing 
interests in a way that they appear to match shared interests 
was common for Primakov. One way that helps Russia gain 
legitimacy for their interests, used by Primakov, is to frame 
Russia as a more responsible country compared to the United 
States in pursuit of common goals, peace and stability. 
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2. How are the goals of action 
pursued most effectively? 
A good way Primakov believes Russia’s interests can be 
effectively pursued is to act as if Russia had already reached 
the position that it actually is still trying to achieve. It helps to 
appear more moral and virtuous than the United States, argue 
that Russia cannot pose a military threat to anyone and try to 
change the rules of the game to better fit Russia’s purposes 
when possible. 
3. How are the risks of political 
action calculated, controlled, and 
accepted? 
 
Primakov often expressed his will to do whatever possible to 
avoid a conflict. But after a thorough examination of his texts, 
there is reason to believe that he was not unwilling to push the 
limits of conflict if Russia’s interests were threatened. He also 
stuck to a stance where he washed his hands of all 
responsibility for things to follow if the United States was first 
seen as provoking a conflict by intentionally stepping on 
Russia’s toes. 
4. What is the best "timing" of 
action to advance one's interests? 
 
Primakov did not think that Russia had time to wait for 
economic recovery before engaging in an active foreign 
policy. The best time to advance interests was now. He also 
seemed to suggest that good times for advancing interests 
were for example when Russia could do something that 
positively differentiated them from the United States. 
5. What is the utility and role of 
different means for advancing 
one's interests? 
Primakov engaged in dualistic rhetoric. On the one hand he 
trumpeted peaceful coexistence and shared interests and on 
the other dropped hints of Russia’s potential aggressive 
reactions if their interests were hurt by others. He also created 
narratives according to which Russia was painted in a positive 
light vis-á-vis their rivals based on which he could demand 
certain developments that would make it easier for Russia to 
reach their goals. 
 
7.2.2. A Patriotic Pragmatist 
If Yevgeny Primakov should not be viewed as a westernizing leader nor as a hard-liner, how then 
should we describe him? This is not an easy task because over the years, he has been labeled many 
things and most of them paint a rather extreme picture in one direction or the other. For example, he 
believed in and advocated for some values that can be classified as liberal and that has led to some 
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treating him as one. Among these liberal values were wanting a strong United Nations and calling for 
the creation of a multipolar world where issues can be tackled together based on mutual interests and 
cooperation. This was partly a reaction to American unilateralism around the world. He also strove 
for a harmonious world and did not want major power relations to slide into a conflict. Another belief 
was that Russia should act as a responsible major power advancing the interests of all, such as fighting 
terrorism, calming down regional conflicts and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
However, it would be naïve to assume that the above listed policies stem from a benevolent and self-
sacrificing point of view. At the same time claiming that these positions are only a smoke screen from 
a hard-liner would not be true either. 
 
A more accurate way to explain Primakov’s world view is to say that he was a patriotic pragmatist, 
with some opportunism mixed in. He had no strong ideological ties. His actions were motivated by 
protecting and advancing Russian interests with the lowest possible cost to everyone involved. For 
example, a stronger United Nations meant less United States and more Russian influence. The case 
with multipolarity was the same and included elements such as cooperation. This was a very subtle 
way of demanding more say in world politics without having to resort to aggression. Also, declaring 
Russia as an entity that is concerned about terrorism, regional conflicts and weapons of mass 
destruction is a great platform for raising Russia’s international profile and allows intervention where 
it otherwise would be harder to justify. Lastly, Primakov’s insistence on always trying to find a route 
that does not lead to confrontation should not be blindly taken at face value. One can argue that at 
least sometimes this call was mostly directed toward others as a warning with the subtle implication 
that if they were to push Russia too far, making them engage in a conflict, Russia would not be 
responsible for the results.  
 
Yevgeny Primakov had no intention to deliberately hurt others. Means chosen for advancing interests 
were selected based on a desirable end goal. Primakov believed in democracy and living in harmony 
with as many people as possible, but if Russian interests were threatened they took precedence over 
liberal values, whatever they may be. In these cases, Primakov may have engaged in narrative creation 
or attempted to frame Russian policies in a way that they appear more virtuous and legitimate than 
they really are. But, this was not about going back to the ways of the Soviet times. In fact, he often 
expressed his distaste for ideological stupidity that led to irrational decisions.  
 
It could be argued that Primakov’s support for many liberal values, including democracy, was based 
on the belief that they advanced Russia’s interests, but he was not an ideological adherent to these 
values. This is another example of his pragmatic use of available means to meet an end. So, it would 
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be wrong to argue that he faked support for liberal values, because he genuinely believed that they 
would help Russia become strong again. And, it would be equally wrong to assert that he was a liberal 
Westernizer, because he was not an ideological adherent. He was in fact the opposite; using these 
values mainly as a means of advancing Russian interests. Using an ideological label, such as liberal 
or neo-Soviet is destined to fail in creating an accurate picture of the man, because he lacked strong 
ideology. This was one of the pitfalls in previous analysis. Understanding Primakov as a patriotic 
pragmatist creates a complete picture of the man, combining both his stanch support for making 
Russia great and his cherry picking of both Western and illiberal methods.  
 
7.2.3. Cognitive Dissonance and Double Standards  
When constructing Yevgeny Primakov’s operational code, it becomes apparent that he may have 
suffered from cognitive dissonance, which refers to holding two or more conflicting beliefs at the 
same time324. This is similar to double standards and comes up often when studying Primakov’s texts. 
Taking this into consideration is critical to understanding him, because without it he appears 
confusing, insincere or both.  
 
Yevgeny Primakov wrote that in a conflict situation a political resolution should always be tried first 
before resorting to the use of force. If force was the only option left, it could be used only after a 
decision by the United Nation’s Security Council.325 Elsewhere, after having repeated the same strict 
conditions and praising the importance of the United Nations, he adds that “collective security, of 
course, to no degree denies the sovereign right of any state in the system to use independent efforts 
to protect its own security.”326 This is a clear example of a double standard. In another context 
Primakov discussed Iran’s uranium enrichment and how Russia had proposed political and diplomatic 
measures to resolve the matter, whereas the United States wanted to put more pressure on Iran. He 
wrote, “The United States insists that the issue should be moved to the UN Security Council to discuss 
it in the political context. This is wrong.”327 He ends in a warning about dividing the world along 
religious and civilizational lines. It seems that the United States was merely trying to resolve an issue 
they had with Iran’s actions in a way advocated by Primakov. But, since Russia wanted to be Iran’s 
protector, Primakov opposed the suggestion to discuss it at the Security Council.  
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When it comes to bloc thinking in Europe Primakov thought that it belonged to the past and he also 
thought that NATO had little reason to exist when nothing threatened Europe anymore328. Yet, in his 
memoir Primakov laments American double standards when they thought they have a special right to 
Latin America, and even Europe, when they do not recognize that Russians had the same right in the 
ex-Soviet states. “They are unwilling to concede, that Russia’s special interest extends to the former 
Soviet republics – not to impose its will on them but to ensure that no threat to Russia’s interests and 
security exists along its borders.”329 The rejection of bloc thinking but wanting recognition for special 
interest zones are an inherent contradiction of their own. In addition, Primakov went further in another 
source by saying that “Russia has an interest in the security and stability of its Baltic neighbors and 
is ready to guarantee their security.”330 Here Primakov seems to have extended Russia’s interest zone 
to the Baltics and in addition brought up guaranteeing their security during times when no such 
agreements should have been necessary.  
 
Finally, Primakov supported strong measures in Chechnya to stabilize the region331. He expressed his 
frustration with the rest of the world not understanding the complexity of the situation332. This falls 
in line with his Statist tendencies and beliefs in a strong government and order. Yet, in light of his 
multiple complaints of American actions in the Middle East, one can only wonder if this could be 
characterized as another example of his cognitive dissonance.  
 
It is not clear, whether Primakov truly has a case of cognitive dissonance, or if he expressed these 
views understanding their contradictory nature. Whatever the case, for students of his policies and 
beliefs, it is important to take into consideration that these issues come up in his texts and must be 
put into a larger context. It should also be understood that it is common for most people, regardless 
of position, to possess some level of cognitive dissonance. When mapping out a person’s belief 
system this becomes much more apparent.  
 
Cognitive dissonance has been linked to Russian politicians in other contexts too. For example, Lilia 
Shevtsova writes in a 2014 article about cognitive dissonance and Russian policies. She pointed out 
certain aspects of Russia’s attitude towards the situation in Ukraine. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Lavrov for example discussed respecting Ukraine’s freedom of choice while at the same time making 
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the case that Ukraine had no right to want to join Europe. Shevtsova concluded her article by saying 
that while normally people try to reconcile their differing ideas, Russian politicians do not seem to 
bother.333 This is an interesting observation. Cognitive dissonance is natural to people and perhaps 
more so for leaders in high politics. Whether it is more prominent in Russia compared to other 
countries should be further researched, but in either case when studying Primakov, it is necessary to 
be aware of its existence.  
 
7.2.4. Making Russia Great 
One of the key elements of Yevgeny Primakov’s operational code is his mission to help Russia regain 
their position as a respected great power with a seat at the global table. He supported many innovative 
strategies for Russia to follow to reach this goal which, with good reason, can be considered the most 
important national interest for Primakov. Among these strategies are the idea of a multipolar world, 
changing the rules of the game to benefit Russia and creating narratives to make Russia appear as a 
benevolent great power. These strategies are easily misunderstood and the motivations behind them 
are easily misjudged. This is partly due to cognitive dissonance in Primakov’s reasoning, and partly 
due to the strategy being carefully crafted so that certain elements of it are meant to be somewhat 
deceptive.  
 
These findings correspond with Anne Clunan’s conclusions. She suggested in her book The Social 
Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests that Primakov 
supported a social creativity strategy which ignored the material power asymmetry between the 
United States and Russia. Instead, he reinvented the basis for evaluating great powers by which the 
United States was acting in a dangerous and revisionist manner whereas Russia was more responsible 
and maintained international order.334 Similarly, Clunan asserted that Primakov’s vision for 
multipolarity, constant referencing of the United Nation’s Security Council and Russia’s role within 
it where part of this social creativity strategy aimed at elevating Russia’s position335. These findings 
strengthen the ones made in this thesis and suggest, that Vladimir Putin has partially adopted 
Primakov’s strategy of what Clunan calls social creativity and multipolarity and changed parts of it 
to fit his personal preferences336.  
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These narratives and framings are one of the most intriguing aspects of Yevgeny Primakov’s views 
and ideas. They are manifestations of his opportunism and belief in shaping history in desired 
directions. These ideas are not all original to Primakov. For example, comparing Russia to others, 
which historically has been Europe, and insisting that Russia must be a great power has been around 
for centuries337. However, Primakov was able to put together a functioning concept that worked at 
home and abroad and has continued to be used after his active years in politics ended. Regaining 
Russia’s past glory was perhaps Primakov’s most important goal. To reach it, he utilized many 
innovative strategies.  
 
7.3. Toward a Primakov Doctrine? 
Yevgeny Primakov has been dead only since 2015, but there has already been discussion of a 
“Primakov Doctrine” which is a new term and not yet widely used. Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sergey Lavrov has stated that 
I believe that in the not so distant future, historians will formulate the concept of a 
Primakov Doctrine. His arrival at the Russian Foreign Ministry brought about a U-turn in 
the nation's foreign policy: it got out of the rut into which its Western partners had tried to 
push it after the disintegration of the USSR, and embarked on an independent course. This 
is the main thing, but certainly not the only thing that Yevgeny Primakov accomplished. 
He is also the author of our foreign policy principle, which had been followed in the 
Russian Empire and in the USSR, but disappeared in the post-Soviet era (in the first half 
of the 1990s), namely, the multi-vector principle, in particular, the striving to develop 
mutually beneficial relations with all countries that are interested in this, and abandoning 
the approach where the eastern and southern vectors of Russia’s foreign policy were 
undervalued.338   
 
Time will of course tell if “a Primakov Doctrine” becomes a recognized term used to describe some 
areas of Russian foreign policy thinking in the future. This might never happen, or perhaps some 
compilation of these ideas might become known as a doctrine named after Primakov. Whatever the 
case, it is possible to detect many of his policy suggestions in the way today’s Russia conducts foreign 
policy. This is not a coincidence since we know that Putin and Lavrov are well aware of Primakov’s 
ideas and not afraid to say so. Russian foreign policy has recently become more “assertive” as Lavrov 
put it, and they have gained more self-confidence. During Primakov’s time Russia did not have the 
means to bring his policies to their conclusion, but Putin has found himself in a more favorable 
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position. This does not mean that Putin and Lavrov are taking orders from Primakov’s handbook, nor 
to say that other figures and ideas have not influenced current policy. However, their actions in 
general seem to be following a logic very similar to what Primakov tried to advocate during his 
lifetime.  
 
Ariel Cohen used the term Primakov Doctrine to describe a policy of partnership between Russia, 
China and Iran which he believed would jeopardize world peace. He believed that the objective of 
the Primakov Doctrine was to water down United States influence and increase Russian influence in 
Eurasia and the Middle East.339 According to A. Pushkov, the Primakov Doctrine is one version of 
Russia’s European role and falls between two extremes. According to him, one of these extremes is 
a Westernist version that follows American lead and was tested by Andrei Kozyrev with disastrous 
results. The other extreme is supported by Nationalists and Communists and suggests that Russia 
should offer an alternative to those disenfranchised with the West. The third and most natural 
alternative for Russia is what the Pushkov calls the Primakov Doctrine. This is a policy of pursuing 
good relations with the West while independently expanding relations with others in the Eastern 
hemisphere.340  
 
What in this thesis is referred to as a new multipolar world order partially touches upon what others 
have called “the Primakov Doctrine”. Vladimir Putin has been said to have continued this policy and 
it seems, that out of all Primakov’s ideas dissected in his operational code, multipolarity is truly 
original to him. As seen above, Primakov’s multipolarity has been understood in the past as both 
limited and broad in its application. However, the basic idea is to diversify Russia’s relations and thus 
take a step back from foreign relations being mainly between Russia and the United States. The 
outcome of this policy can be defined as increasing Russian influence around the world while 
decreasing American influence in the same areas. The term “Primakov Doctrine” has not yet become 
a mainstream concept and it does not have a strictly defined meaning. Yet, the way it is currently 
understood by many scholars and even Sergey Lavrov suggest that it is still being implemented as a 
foreign policy strategy. Perhaps the Primakov Doctrine could also be expanded in the future to 
comprehend more elements or other doctrines could be coined which pay tribute to Primakov. 
However, more research is needed, and this thesis and Yevgeny Primakov’s operational code can act 
as a good starting point for future research. Alternatively, if Russian leaders start to refer to a group 
of policy objectives as a “Primakov Doctrine” it would become an established and official doctrine. 
It remains to be seen whether this will happen in the near future or not.  
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7.4. Comparing Yevgeny Primakov and Vladimir Putin’s Operational 
Codes 
Lastly, we will take a look at Putin’s operational code which Stephen Benedict Dyson published 
already in 2001, and an updated version in 2018 coauthored with Matthew J. Parent. These two pieces 
of research will be compared to the findings of this thesis to see how similar Putin and Primakov 
actually are based on their operational codes. At first glance, Putin and Primakov may sound like very 
different individuals because sometimes Putin may use language that is quite harsh whereas Primakov 
tended to be much more diplomatic and calculating. Yet, both men have those critics that claim them 
to be hard-liners operating on zero-sum thinking341. However, we should not let style differences 
distract us because both men’s operational codes are quite complimentary. Dyson and Parent argue 
that overall Putin’s thinking is quite mainstream342. Interestingly, after studying both men’s 
operational codes, it becomes apparent that they both try to stay away from ideologies343.  
 
For Putin, political life is harmonious if governed by rules, norms and laws344. For Primakov the 
world could become harmonious if everyone worked together towards a multipolar world, including 
the United States. For both men, order and control were important positive attributes345. Perhaps more 
so for Putin. Thus, striving for a world that is as harmonious as possible from the Russian point of 
view was a top priority for both. The means for reaching this goal are somewhat different. Putin’s 
interventions in Chechnya, Ukraine and Syria were found to ultimately be about fighting state 
weakness and preventing chaos346. For Primakov, pursuing a multipolar world had similar 
motivations. Additionally, both Primakov and Putin were concerned about building a stronger state 
domestically347. Interestingly, their concern about preventing chaos renders their worlds quite fragile.  
 
Primakov’s opponents were oligarchs, who were working only for their own good, against the 
interests of others. He also viewed the United States as a rival and kept constantly comparing Russia 
to them. Putin’s opponents are those who have stepped outside the law such as terrorists, corrupt 
businessmen and officials348. Terrorism seems to bring out the most hostility from Putin349. He is 
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quite obsessed with rules and obeying them, with the caveat that if someone breaks them, all bets are 
off and they can be treated even in a violent way as a punishment for their misbehavior350. For 
Primakov, it was important that people work towards the common good and that no one stepped on 
each other’s toes when it comes to interests. He too had a similar idea with punishment: that if 
someone has worked against shared and/or Russian interests, Russia could retaliate, and the 
opponents could then only blame themselves. Both Primakov and Putin seemed to think that one way 
or another, their opponents were responsible for Russia’s reaction to their misbehavior351. For them, 
the ball is always in the other court, and especially Putin makes it clear that others are treated well if 
they first treat him well352. Putin was especially vocal about terrorists when it comes to retaliation, 
whereas Primakov was more fixed on evaluating American behavior, which was not very prominent 
in Putin’s operational code by Dyson.  
 
Putin was said to reconcile breaking rules in Chechnya to fight terrorism by his strong belief in order 
and dislike of chaos took precedence over everything else. According to Dyson, Putin’s behavior is 
not a contradiction, but rather about his priorities: chaos must be prevented.353,354 Primakov could be 
argued to have had similar tendencies when it comes to the liberal values he so often advocated versus 
Russian interests, which took precedence over everything else.  
 
Dyson and Parent argue that Putin is more of an opportunist and a tactician than a grand strategist355. 
Primakov has earlier been said to possess some opportunistic tendencies, but an overview of his ideas 
and policies show that he was more of a grand strategist. Since Primakov was not very ideological, 
instead motivated by interests, he was willing to match creative means to his ends. Overall, it must 
be remembered that an operational code analysis cannot possibly comprehend a person’s whole belief 
system. This means that when comparing two different operational codes, we are actually comparing 
two incomplete assessments.  
 
Despite this we can conclude that Yevgeny Primakov and Vladimir Putin’s operational codes are 
remarkably complementary. They both strove towards harmony and order with similar ideas about 
how to deal with those who stood in their way. Putin cannot stand rule-breakers and Primakov was 
irritated by those who worked against common interests. Putin respects Primakov and his 
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contributions to Russian foreign policy and neither one of them is particularly ideological. Comparing 
their operational codes partially helps explain why Putin has relied on Primakov’s advice so much in 
the past. Additionally, we can speculate that perhaps Putin has adopted many of Primakov’s ideas 
because he himself lacks the qualities of a grand strategist, an area where Primakov was remarkably 
good at with his long-term vision approach.  
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis was written because Yevgeny Primakov has not been given enough credit for his 
contributions to Russian foreign policy despite his long career in politics and because he has been 
largely misunderstood. Not only was he a seasoned politician and a diplomat, but he also had a major 
influence on the Russian Federation’s foreign policy formulation during the critical early years of the 
1990s. Surprisingly, no one has conducted a thorough investigation of his operational code before. 
This opened up a good opportunity to reveal his thinking and worldview through this very useful tool. 
Over the years, differing interpretations about his significance and policies have been presented. This 
thesis was able to take part in the conversation by coming up with a new way of understanding 
Primakov as a man, how he thought about Russia vis-á-vis the rest of the world, and what kinds of 
beliefs he held. Understanding Primakov’s operational code will provide new insights into Russian 
foreign policy development and open up new areas of research.  
 
Instead of calling Primakov a hard-liner or a westernizer, describing him as a patriotic pragmatist is 
a more accurate term. Primakov’s actions were mostly motivated by protecting and advancing 
Russian interests with the lowest acceptable cost to everyone. He was opportunistic and sometimes 
wrapped his intentions in liberal sounding motivations and, while not insincere, he did not have 
ideological undertones. 
 
Policymakers and foreign policy scholars should pay more attention to Yevgeny Primakov’s 
influence. This study has found that Primakov indeed heavily influenced Russian foreign policy, not 
only by reinventing the Statist school of thought and helping to make it the mainstream policy line 
for years to come, but also by putting forward foreign policy ideas that have been put in practice in 
recent years. Even though many of his ideas and the policies derived from them are not original to 
him, he managed to mix and match them to create functioning policy options.  The most prominent 
of these is the idea of a multipolar world with the intention of improving Russia’s standing in 
international affairs and helping them to reach the status of a great power again. Primakov’s ideas are 
studied in Russia today with the encouragement of Vladimir Putin. Starting in 2016, IMEMO began 
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hosting an annual Primakov Reading summit to study his ideas. His importance to Russia has been 
specifically highlighted by Putin at these events356. Primakov and Putin share fairly similar 
operational codes, but the latter is most likely to look for guidance in the former’s ideas because Putin 
is more of a tactician whereas Primakov was a grand-strategist.  
 
Investigating Yevgeny Primakov’s operational code proved to be very fruitful. Alexander George’s 
ten questions are well formulated to bring out important aspects of one’s way of viewing the world 
and his method was found to be a very good tool in the context of this thesis. However, because this 
was a qualitative study which left much room for interpretation, results cannot be taken as 100% 
accurate. Studying individuals is very difficult, as mentioned earlier, but undertaking such studies 
should not be avoided because it is challenging. In order to gain deeper understanding of Russian 
foreign policy, one must at times pick small parts to study in order to understand the bigger picture 
at the domestic and, ultimately, at the international level. In the future, similar studies on Primakov 
could be undertaken. For example, it might be beneficial to conduct a study where the evolution of 
Russia’s great power thinking and Statism are thoroughly investigated and their link to Primakov 
researched. Similarly, in the future other scholars may want take a look at the so called “Primakov 
Doctrine” and determine whether the current administration is implementing it or not.  
 
Primakov was most active in Russian high politics during a transition period for the country when 
Russia was seeking a new direction. It could be argued that because of this special period in Russia’s 
history the role of individuals regarding foreign policy development was more prominent when 
compared to past periods. During normal times Russia does not tend to have a very high turnover rate 
at the top levels of government, putting even more emphasis on specific individuals and their efforts 
to advance their preferred policies. Undoubtedly, Yevgeny Primakov with his beliefs and worldview 
has been one of the most influential, yet almost forgotten, figures in Russian foreign policy circles.  
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